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Imagine the following situation. One night you missed the last bus, so you have to walk your 
way home. You’re walking along the street by yourself, lost in thought, when suddenly you 
hear a strange noise coming from the shady roadside. Instinctively you back away and 
immediately you become more vigilant and attentive. Most people will recognize the energy 
boost that a sudden fright can give you, especially when you were lost in thought. The 
physical avoidance response of backing away seems a natural reaction in the face of threat or 
aversive encounters, just as the automatic tendency to become more vigilant and cognitively 
energized when things become difficult. 
When you think back of this frightening experience at a later time, you may again 
experience a mild version of the shivers and the adrenaline boost that you had on this 
occasion. Apparently, memories of events comprise various modalities of the original 
experience that seem to be re-experienced in an interrelated manner such that the activation 
of one aspect of the experience tends to re-activate other aspects as well. Crucially, not only 
may a memory lead to the re-experience of the physical sensations you had, but -- conversely 
-- physical correlates of a situation may also re-activate the mental or cognitive state you 
were in. Therefore, the question can be raised whether merely performing an avoidance 
motor action, such as backing away, that usually accompanies situations that call for 
vigilance, may be sufficient to bring about a vigilant, energized state of mind, resulting in 
enhanced cognitive functioning. 
 The assumption that memories and knowledge encompass embodied experiences 
such as motoric, sensory, or auditory states forms an integral part of embodiment theories.  
Embodiment research provided evidence that cognitive content and affective experiences can 
indeed elicit associated bodily states, and vice versa. For instance, merely performing arm 
movements that are indicative of approaching or avoiding an object tend to affect the liking 
Chapter 1 
 12 
of neutral objects in congruent ways (i.e., more positive evaluations are elicited by approach 
compared to avoidance movements; Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993).  
This evaluative embodiment effect -- i.e., arm movements affecting object liking -- 
illustrates the kind of phenomena the embodiment literature has so far primarily addressed. 
Most earlier research builds on the general assumption that memories or knowledge 
structures are composed of different interrelated modalities of the original experience that are 
jointly re-activated. In the present dissertation we aim to demonstrate that bodily states may 
have much broader and more fundamental effects on human functioning that go beyond the 
re-activation of discrete cognitive and affective states. More specifically, we argue that the 
mere performance of certain bodily actions acts upon human functioning by regulating the 
amount of cognitive energy that becomes available in a given situation. The up- and down-
regulation of cognitive energy affects the individual as a whole, thereby influencing human 
functioning at a fundamental level. These regulatory qualities of bodily states can be seen as a 
new functional layer in embodiment accounts that complements and extends the existing 
body of research.   
The present dissertation focuses specifically on the control-regulatory consequences 
of approach and avoidance bodily actions and looks into the processes underlying these 
effects. We propose that approach and avoidance bodily actions differentially influence 
cognitive functioning due to the different resource requirements they are associated with. As 
the introductory example illustrated, avoidance bodily actions, as opposed to approach bodily 
actions, are habitually performed in situations that call for vigilance and deliberate action. 
Therefore, the mere execution of an avoidance motor action may tend to recruit the cognitive 
resources that are usually required in this specific context. The greater mobilization of 
cognitive resources should lead to the enhancement of cognitive functions generally referred 
to as cognitive control. 
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Before outlining the empirical chapters of this dissertation, we will provide an 
overview of the existing embodiment literature, with special attention being paid to research 
on approach-avoidance motor actions. Next, we will define the concept cognitive control and 
review relevant research findings in this domain. In a last step, insights from both the 
embodiment and cognitive control literature will be integrated, leading to the formulation of 
concrete predictions regarding the effects of approach-avoidance motor actions on the 
recruitment of cognitive control. In the empirical chapters to follow, these predictions will be 
investigated.   
 
The embodiment perspective 
The notion that bodily states influence human cognition and affect has a long history in 
psychology and dates at least back to William James (1884; see also Lange, 1885/1922) who 
brought up the controversial assertion that changes in bodily states are not the consequence 
but the cause of emotional experiences. James challenged the common view that the 
perception of an external stimulus directly excites an emotion, from which the bodily 
expression may follow. Instead he proposed that “bodily changes follow directly the 
perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the 
emotion” (James, 1884, p. 189). Adopting James’ famous example to illustrate his point, it is 
not the case that we encounter a bear, get frightened and run. According to James the bodily 
manifestation precedes the emotional reaction, that is, we feel frightened because we run 
away.     
 More recent embodiment accounts likewise assign bodily states a central role in 
human cognition and affect (Barsalou, 1999; Damasio, 1989; Glenberg, 1997; Semin & 
Smith, 2008). According to Barsalou’s (1999, 2005, 2008) influential Perceptual Symbol 
Systems theory (PSS) bodily states and other phenomenological experiences lie at the heart 
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of human functioning. PSS posits that knowledge is not represented in abstract, amodal ways, 
but instead captured in the modal states that accompanied the original experience, such as 
visual, auditory, motor, somatosensory, or olfactory sensations. For instance, the knowledge 
about the concept “banana” is made up of the phenomenological experiences gathered on 
previous occasions, such as a banana’s smell, taste, its visual features, and the motor 
programs implemented for peeling and eating it. According to PSS, the knowledge captured 
in modal states becomes accessible to higher order cognitive processes through partial 
simulation or reactivation of these states in the brain’s modal systems. As a consequence, 
basic human capacities as memory, knowledge, language, and thought are grounded in 
embodied states.         
The centrality of embodied states to human functioning has been recognized by 
different research domains, most prominently social psychology and cognitive psychology. A 
wide range of studies focused on the interplay between cognition and affect on the one hand, 
and embodied states on the other. However, until recently a unifying theoretical account for 
these research findings has been missing. The embodied nature of knowledge representation 
proposed by embodied theories of cognition offers a framework for integrating and 
explaining the various embodiment effects that arose from different research domains. The 
next subsections review several relevant embodiment effects (for a more exhaustive review 
see Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003; see also Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal, 
Barsalou, Winkielman, Kraut-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Semin & Smith, 2008; Smith & Semin, 
2004).  
 
Two classes of phenomena  
Embodied states have played an important role in different research traditions for decades, 
although the term embodiment emerged only relatively recently. In the present dissertation, 
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we distinguish between two distinct classes of embodiment effects. The majority of studies so 
far has looked into the effects of bodily states on discrete cognitive and affective states, and 
vice versa, which we refer to as the first class of phenomena. Although some of the research 
findings date earlier than the theories of embodied cognition described in the previous section 
(e.g., Wells & Petty, 1980), the effects converge with the general assumption of these 
accounts. More precisely, the embodied nature of knowledge representations offers a 
theoretical framework wherein these effects can be placed. 
 However, we argue that bodily states may also have broader implications for human 
functioning, as briefly outlined at the beginning of this introduction. More specifically, we 
propose that certain motor actions may instigate the up- and down-regulation of cognitive 
control, leading to either enhanced or impaired performance on tasks that are reliant on 
cognitive resources. These regulatory implications of bodily states have so far not been 
addressed in the embodiment literature, although some studies on approach and avoidance 
related bodily states have revealed processing and mind set effects that are consistent with the 
regulatory mechanisms that we propose. In the section on embodiment research pertaining to 
approach and avoidance tendencies, these effects will be discussed in greater detail. The 
control-regulatory processes elicited by bodily states go beyond the effects captured in the 
first class of embodiment effects in terms of scope. Hence, we propose to regard these effects 
as a second class of phenomena in embodiment research.  
 
Discrete affective and cognitive embodiment effects 
The first class of embodied effects addresses the interconnectedness of bodily states and their 
affective and cognitive counterparts. That is, cognitive and affective states tend to elicit 
corresponding bodily actions, and bodily actions tend to elicit corresponding affective and 
cognitive states. A well-known example for the influence of cognitive content on bodily 
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action is the intriguing finding that people tend to move slower after being unobtrusively 
exposed to words related to the elderly stereotype (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; for a 
review see Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). Processing words related to the elderly seems to 
activate knowledge about their characteristic features, including the knowledge that elderly 
tend to move slowly. Activation of this knowledge subsequently influences peoples’ actual 
movements. In a complementary fashion, Mussweiler (2006) demonstrated that stereotypic 
movements activate the corresponding stereotype. Participants who were induced to move 
slowly subsequently attributed more elderly-stereotypic characteristics to a target person than 
did control participants. Similarly, a wide range of other phenomena have an influence on, or 
are influenced by, bodily states. Head nodding and shaking influence agreement with a 
persuasive message (Wells & Petty, 1980; see also Briñol & Petty, 2003), memory for 
valenced information (Förster & Strack, 1996), and preferences for objects (Tom, Pettersen, 
Lau, Burton, & Cook, 1991). It has also been shown that body postures affect emotional 
experiences (Duclos et al., 1989; Riskind & Gotay, 1982; Stepper & Strack, 1993), and facial 
expressions produce corresponding affective reactions (Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989; Ito, 
Chiao, Devine, Lorig, & Cacioppo, 2006; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). Similarly, 
several studies appeal to the embodied nature of language comprehension (Glenberg, 2008; 
Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006), and object recognition and 
categorization (Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001). In support of the modal nature of knowledge 
representations proposed by embodiment theories, neuroscientific research has shown that 
cognitive operations tend to be accompanied by activation in brain areas in which relevant 
modal information is stored (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Chao & Martin, 2000; Martin & Chao, 
2001).  
 As the foregoing paragraphs illustrate, various studies have examined the link 
between bodily states on the one hand, and corresponding cognitive and affective states on 
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the other. Findings from different research domains, investigating diverse forms of bodily 
states, converge on the point that human cognition and affect are fundamentally grounded in, 
and inseparably connected to, embodied experiences. Next, we turn to a specific subset of 
bodily actions that the present work is directed at, namely bodily actions expressing approach 
and avoidance tendencies.  
 
Approach and avoidance tendencies 
Approach and avoidance tendencies can be considered some of the most fundamental and 
powerful forces in guiding human behavior. In support of this notion, the general principles 
of approach and avoidance play a prominent role in a diverse range of psychological research 
domains, including, for instance, interpersonal attraction (e.g., Byrne & Griffitt, 1973), 
attitudes (Cacioppo et al., 1993), attachment styles (Bowlby, 1969), intergroup bias (e.g., 
Paladino & Castelli, 2008; Shah, Brazy, & Higgins, 2004), prejudice (e.g., Kawakami, Phills, 
Steele, & Dovidio, 2007; Pryor, Reeder, Yeadon, & Hesson-McInnis, 2004), personality traits 
(e.g., Carver, Sutton, & Scheier, 2000; Elliot & Thrash, 2002; O’Connor, Colder, & Hawk, 
2004), and phobias and other anxiety disorders (e.g., Heuer, Rinck, & Becker, 2007). 
It is generally assumed that behavior is regulated by two separate systems, one system 
that responds to incentives and rewards and regulates action tendencies towards desired end 
states (i.e., the approach system), and one system that responds to threat and punishment and 
regulates action tendencies away from aversive stimuli (i.e., the avoidance system). Several 
theoretical accounts of behavior regulation are based on the distinction between these two 
systems (e.g., Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1990, 1994; Higgins, 
1998; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990, 1992; Schneirla, 1959), although different 
terminology has been used to refer to them (e.g., appetitive vs. aversive motivation, 
behavioral activation vs. behavioral inhibition system, behavioral approach vs. behavioral 
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inhibition system, approach vs. withdrawal motivation; see e.g., Carver et al., 2000; Gable, 
Reis, & Elliot, 2003).  
 
The neurological basis of approach and avoidance 
The distinction between the approach and avoidance system also manifests itself on a neural 
level. As an extensive body of research has documented, left frontal brain activity is 
associated with approach behavior and right frontal brain activity with avoidance or 
withdrawal behavior (e.g., Davidson, 1992, 2002; Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Davidson, 
Marshall, Tomarken, & Henriques, 2000; Davidson, Saron, Senulis, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990; 
Harmon-Jones, 2003, 2004; Murphy, Nimmo-Smityh, & Lawrence, 2003; Pizzagalli, 
Sherwood, Henriques, & Davidson, 2005; Sobotka, Davidson, & Senulis, 1992; see also 
Koch, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2009b). Indications for the asymmetrical involvement of 
the left and right hemispheres in approach and avoidance behavior have been observed in 
animals as well (e.g., Quaranta, Siniscalchi, & Vallortigara, 2007; Vallortigara & Rogers, 
2005). In addition to the lateralized nature of approach and avoidance, specific brain regions 
have been identified as being involved in approach or avoidance related states at a more 
refined level of analysis (for a meta-analysis see Wager, Luan Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 
2003; see also Cunningham, Johnson, Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 2003; Davidson & Irwin, 
1999; Elliot & Covington, 2001; Smillie, 2008). For instance, activity in the amygdala, the 
cerebellum, and the insula has been related to avoidance motivational states, whereas activity 
in the anterior regions of the medial prefrontal cortex and dopamine release in the nucleus 
accumbens have been related to approach motivational states. Nevertheless, the notion of a 
general prefrontal asymmetry of approach and avoidance related states is widely accepted 
across different research domains.  
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Embodying approach and avoidance tendencies  
Strikingly, the terms approach and avoidance already convey an inherent motoric connotation 
by implying movement towards or away from a stimulus. Approach refers to decreasing, and 
avoidance to increasing the physical distance between the self and an object in the 
environment. In earlier research approach and avoidance bodily actions were most frequently 
operationalized as arm flexion, as in pulling an object toward the self (approach) and arm 
extension, as in pushing an object away from the self (avoidance). Solarz (1960) conducted 
pioneering research on automatic arm flexion and arm extension responses towards valenced 
stimuli. In this early study participants had to evaluate positive and negative stimulus words 
presented on a movable stage by means of pushing the stage away from them or pulling it 
toward them. Reaction times showed that participants were faster at initiating compatible 
movements (i.e., pulling positive words closer and pushing negative words away) than at 
initiating incompatible movements (i.e., pulling negative words closer and pushing positive 
words away; see also Chen & Bargh, 1999, who replicated and extended the Solarz, 1960, 
findings with a computer-driven apparatus, and Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002, 
who extended the paradigm to novel stimuli; cf. Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004).  
Notably, engaging the motor system by means of arm flexion and extension has not 
only been implemented as a dependent measure (that is, as a means to gauge facilitated and 
hampered movement tendencies), but also as a means to manipulate approach-avoidance 
motivational orientations. As a first demonstration, Cacioppo et al. (1993; see also Priester, 
Cacioppo, & Petty, 1996) investigated the effect of approach-avoidance arm movements on 
affective evaluations. Participants were instructed to either press their hand upward against 
the underside of the tabletop to induce arm flexor contraction (approach) or to press 
downward on the table to induce arm extensor contraction (avoidance) while viewing neutral 
Chinese characters. Afterwards participants were asked to indicate their liking of the 
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characters. Characters viewed during the approach arm movement were evaluated more 
positively than characters viewed during the avoidance arm movement. 
 Several studies further support the notion that approach and avoidance bodily actions 
elicit effects that are congruent with the evaluative connotation of the respective movement, 
or, in a complementary fashion, demonstrate that congruency between the evaluative 
connotation of bodily action and evaluated stimulus produces facilitation effects. For 
instance, coherence between approach-avoidance movements and primed affective concepts 
(Centerbar, Schnall, Clore, & Garvin, 2008) or valenced information (Förster & Strack, 1998) 
enhances memory performance, approach and avoidance movements affect motivation to eat 
or drink (Förster, 2003), and influence the evaluation of valenced products (Förster, 2004) 
and attractive or unattractive strangers (Förster, 1998).  
 
General processing and mind set effects 
The research findings on approach and avoidance motor actions reviewed so far primarily tap 
into the first class of embodiment effects, building on the common underlying assumption 
that motor actions are an integral part of modal memory representations of associated 
cognitive and affective states. However, as mentioned previously, bodily states may also 
affect human functioning in a more general sense. Studies speaking to these broader 
implications of bodily states are surprisingly rare and emanate primarily from research on 
approach and avoidance motor actions. With regard to these specific motor actions, some 
general processing and mind set effects have been reported. 
 
Creativity and analytical reasoning 
A line of research by Friedman and Förster (2000, 2002) has investigated the effects of 
approach and avoidance motor actions on creativity. In several experiments, the effects of 
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arm flexion and arm extension on different aspects of creative insight were examined, such as 
contextual set breaking, restructuring, and mental search. In one experiment, participants 
were instructed to generate as many creative uses for a brick as they could think of (Friedman 
& Förster, 2002; Experiment 2). While generating uses, half of the participants performed an 
arm flexion, and the other half an arm extension motor action. Participants performing the 
approach motor action came up with more creative solutions (e.g., “using the brick as a slide 
for my hamster”) than participants performing an avoidance movement (e.g., “throw it”). 
Notably, the two arm conditions did not differ with regard to the total number of responses, 
but merely with regard to the creativity of the generated solutions. In another experiment, a 
measure of inclusiveness of categorization was administered under either arm flexion or arm 
extension conditions (Friedman & Förster, 2000; Experiment 6). In this categorization task, 
participants have to rate how well an exemplar (e.g., “bicycle”) fits in a certain category 
(“vehicle”). Participants in the approach condition made more inclusive categorization (i.e., 
rated atypical exemplars as better category members, such as “camel” for the category 
“vehicle”) than participants in the avoidance condition. These results suggest that 
participants’ ability to overcome preexisting concepts and see relationships between disparate 
elements was enhanced by performing approach compared to avoidance motor actions 
(Friedman & Förster, 2000).  
Additionally, Friedman and Förster (2000; Experiment 7) assessed the analytical 
reasoning abilities of participants who performed either arm flexion or arm extension 
movements. The task consisted of several GRE reasoning problems that required participants 
to evaluate the truth value of a number of propositions, given an initial set of basic facts. On 
this reasoning task, participants in the avoidance condition significantly outperformed those 
in the approach and control conditions in terms of the number of reasoning problems 
correctly solved.  
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 Friedman and Förster based their predictions regarding the influence of approach-
avoidance motor actions on creativity and analytical reasoning abilities on cognitive tuning 
theory (Schwarz, 1990, 2002; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). This 
theoretical account proposes that affective states signaling problematic environments (such as 
negative mood) engender a systematic processing style, whereas affective states signaling 
benign environments (such as positive mood) engender a heuristic processing style. 
According to Friedman and Förster (2000, 2002), the enhanced creativity resulting from 
performing approach motor actions may reflect a heuristic processing style, as these motor 
actions may be likewise indicative of benign environments. Correspondingly, the enhanced 
reasoning ability due to avoidance motor actions may reflect a systematic processing style, as 
avoidance movements may be indicative of problematic environments.   
 
Attentional scope 
In a related vein, the effects of approach and avoidance motor actions on the scope of 
conceptual attention have been investigated (Förster, Friedman, Özelsel, & Denzler, 2006; 
Experiment 2). A narrowed scope of conceptual attention refers to a mind set in which the 
activation of mental representations is restricted to those with a high accessibility within a 
certain context (e.g., close semantic associations to a primed word), whereas a broader scope 
of conceptual attention extends the range of activated mental representations to those with a 
lower accessibility (e.g., distantly related associations to a primed word). Approach and 
avoidance motor actions were found to differentially influence attentional scope. More 
specifically, approach motor actions tended to broaden, and avoidance motor actions tended 
to narrow, the scope of conceptual attention. 
 These findings provide preliminary evidence that motor actions may have effects on 
human functioning that go beyond the mutual links between bodily states and discrete 
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affective or cognitive states. Importantly, these processing outcomes appear consistent with 
the control-regulatory account that we propose. Although not tested in these studies, the up- 
and down-regulation of cognitive resources may also be the mechanism underlying these 
effects. In contrast to these prior studies, we aim to directly address the role that cognitive 
control plays in the effects of approach-avoidance motor actions on cognitive performance.   
 
A note on the context-dependency of approach-avoidance motor actions 
Recently, it has been suggested that the meaning of approach and avoidance bodily actions 
may be sensitive to context (e.g., Bamford & Ward, 2008; Eder & Rothermund, 2008; 
Markman & Brendl, 2005; Seibt, Neumann, Nussinson, & Strack, 2008). It should be noted 
that we agree with the general notion of context dependency of these movements. In our 
view, it makes sense that the default meanings of bodily actions are easily overwritten or 
adjusted when they are placed in a different context, as any bodily action obviously never 
serves only a single purpose. Therefore, a different context or framing may trigger a different 
meaning of the same movement. Nevertheless, arm flexion and arm extension bodily actions 
seem to have a robust default meaning as suggested by the consistent research findings 
reviewed earlier, in which no alternative context was made salient. However, the present 
work is not concerned with the context sensitivity of approach-avoidance movements, but 
instead bears on their default meaning.  
 
Cognitive control 
Exerting cognitive control can take many forms. Dividing focused attention between different 
tasks (e.g., making a phone call while at the same time preparing a meal and keeping an eye 
on the children) is an example that has entered common language use under the term 
multitasking. Other instances include the suppression of habitual behavior (e.g., not ordering 
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your usual chocolate dessert when you are on a diet), or the ability to stay concentrated on a 
task in the face of distractions (e.g., trying to follow the newscast while a birthday party is 
going on around you). Simply stated, cognitive control refers to the various cognitive abilities 
that ensure that we do what we want (Hommel, Daum, & Kluwe, 2004). 1, 2 
 
Factors influencing cognitive control 
Cognitive control functions have been studied in relation to a wide range of phenomena, 
including executive functions deficits resulting from clinical or neuropsychiatric disorders or 
cortical lesions (e.g., Greene, Braet, Johnson, & Bellgrove, 2008; Nieuwenstein, Aleman, & 
de Haan, 2001; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Sergeant, Geurts, & Oosterlaan, 2002; Stuss et 
al., 2000) and age-related declines in cognitive control (e.g., Elderkin-Thompson, Ballmeier, 
Hellemann, Pham, & Kumar, 2008; Mayr, Spieler, & Kliegl, 2001; Salthouse, Atkinson, & 
Berish, 2003). Furthermore, cognitive control has been shown to be subject to contextual 
factors such as mental fatigue (Lorist, Boksem, & Ridderinkhof, 2005), social factors such as 
interracial interactions (Richeson & Shelton, 2003), individual characteristics such as action 
orientation (Jostmann & Koole, 2007) and power (Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk, 
2008), and mood states (Mitchell & Phillips, 2007). With respect to mood states research 
results were not totally conclusive. Globally, -- compared to neutral mood -- positive mood 
tended to impair certain executive functions, whereas negative mood seemed to have little 
effect on cognitive control processes (see Mitchell & Phillips, 2007, for a review).   
 
 
                                                 
1
 The term “cognitive control” could also be substituted by the terms “executive control” or “executive 
functions” as they basically refer to the same processes and are often used interchangeably in the literature. 
2
 The exact definition of cognitive control, as well as the number and precise nature of the functions that 
constitute cognitive control have been subject for debate (e.g., Heyder, Suchan, & Daum, 2004). In the present 
dissertation, we use the term cognitive control in a strict sense to refer to effortful, capacity-consuming 
cognitive abilities. 
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The unitary versus distributed nature of cognitive control  
As outlined above, cognitive control can be considered an umbrella term for various 
cognitive abilities that underlie intentional, willful behavior. In contrast to this distributed 
view of cognitive control, translating goals and intentions into action has long been assumed 
to depend on a unitary executive control instance (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Johnson-Laird, 
1983; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Norman & Shallice, 1986; cf. Salthouse, 1992). However, 
these conceptualizations of cognitive control have been criticized for being merely a 
placeholder for what we still fail to understand (Hommel et al., 2004; Monsell, 1996; Rogers 
& Monsell, 1995). Only recently, research has started to unravel discrete mechanisms of 
cognitive control and their neurological basis. In an attempt to classify cognitive control 
processes, Smith and Jonides (1999) distinguished between five basic cognitive control 
functions, attention and inhibition, task management, planning, monitoring, and coding. 
According to Smith and Jonides, the first two constitute the most elementary functions. 
Attention and inhibition refers to the ability to focus attention on relevant, and away from 
irrelevant, information whereas task management reflects the ability to schedule processes in 
complex tasks, including the ability to switch focused attention between different tasks.  
 
Neural correlates of cognitive control 
Brain research has been directed at identifying the neural substrates of cognitive control. 
There is consensus that the prefrontal cortex plays a central role in executive functioning (see 
Alvarez & Emory, 2006, and Miller & Cohen, 2001, for reviews of the involvement of the 
prefrontal cortex in cognitive control; see also Funahashi, 2001; Miller, 2000; Smith & 
Jonides, 1999). However, various cortical and subcortical brain regions seem to contribute to 
the execution of cognitive control, including the basal ganglia, the cerebellum, the anterior 
cingulate cortex, and the thalamus (e.g., Heyder, Suchan, & Daum, 2004). Some functional 
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systems (e.g., working memory; Engle & Kane, 2004) and brain areas (e.g., the prefrontal 
cortex) seem to contribute to executive functioning in general, whereas other brain regions 
are uniquely associated with specific cognitive control functions (e.g., Heyder et al., 2004; 
Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Marklund et al., 2007; cf. Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, 
Witzki, & Howerter, 2000).  
Besides localizing neural regions that are involved in exerting cognitive control, 
neurocognitive accounts have addressed the crucial question how the need for cognitive 
control is detected in the human cognitive system. Most prominently, conflict-monitoring 
theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004) 
offered a framework for the recruitment of cognitive control. According to this theory, the 
anterior cingulate cortex monitors information processing for the occurrence of conflict and 
initiates compensatory adjustments in cognitive control when necessary. Neuroscientific 
evidence corroborated the proposed monitoring and adjustment function of the anterior 
cingulate cortex (Botvinick et al., 2004). Importantly, Botvinick et al. (2004) proposed that 
conflict monitoring might “represent one aspect of a more general monitoring function, 
which detects internal states signaling a need to intensify or redirect attention or control” 
(Botvinick et al., 2004, p. 539). In line with the notion of a general monitoring function that is 
responsive to a wider range of internal cues, we propose that motor actions related to 
approach and avoidance may engender adjustments in cognitive control. More concretely, 
avoidance motor actions meet the criteria of internally monitored states that indicate the need 
to intensify attention or control, therefore these motor actions are expected to increase the 
recruitment of cognitive control. Approach motor actions, in contrast, are expected to 
downregulate cognitive control, as these motor actions signal low energy requirements.3 
 
                                                 
3
 Please note that exceptions to this general rule may exist. For instance, the behavior of a person who attacks 
another person in rage may be both approach motivated and energy demanding. 
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Cognitive control as a limited resource 
Because exerting cognitive control is an effortful process, it is subject to capacity constraints 
and depends on the availability of cognitive resources. In support of this notion, mental 
fatigue has been shown to result in impaired cognitive control (Lorist et al., 2005). Exerting 
control has been previously compared to a muscle that becomes fatigued by prolonged use 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Acts of cognitive control thus consume a limited resource 
that needs to be replenished in order to avoid failures in cognitive functioning. When 
cognitive resources run short, individuals find themselves in a state of cognitive deficiency 
that has been referred to as cognitive depletion or ego depletion (Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000; see also Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Engle, Conway, Tuholski, 
& Shisler, 1995; Muraven, Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006; Schmeichel, Demaree, Robinson, & 
Pu, 2006; Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005). When cognitive resources become depleted 
by the exertion of control, performance on subsequent tasks usually suffers. For instance, 
performing a thought suppression exercise has been found to impair subsequent persistence 
on an unsolvable puzzle and the ability to suppress emotional reactions (Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000).  
 Following the same logic, performance on a subsequent task serves as an index for the 
amount of cognitive resources expended on an initial cognitive control task. We will build on 
this limited resource account in order to underpin our hypothesis that avoidance bodily cues 
lead to greater mobilization of cognitive resources than approach bodily cues.   
 
Approach-avoidance motor actions and cognitive control 
Everyday human functioning is fundamentally dependent upon cognitive control processes. 
Without the intervention of cognitive control, human behavior would be error-prone and 
inefficient. However, due to capacity constraints, reliance on cognitive control cannot be the 
Chapter 1 
 28 
default operating mode. To function efficiently an individual needs to recruit cognitive 
control functions solely in situations that actually require their intervention. This raises the 
fundamental question on what basis a situation may be classified as requiring the recruitment 
of control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001).  
Both internal and external signals are probable candidates, and presumably the up- 
and down-regulation of cognitive control processes is ultimately regulated by an interplay of 
various internal and external factors. With regard to external signals, characteristics of the 
task itself, for instance, may indicate the need to recruit control processes. In support of this 
notion, Kahneman (1973) observed that individuals tend to amplify their efforts when the 
difficulty of a task rises. That is, in order to maintain a certain level of performance, more 
mental effort is allocated to a task when task difficulty is increased (see also Washburn & 
Putney, 2001).  
 Certainly more compellingly, compensatory adjustments in cognitive control may also 
be triggered by signals that have their origin inside the individual, like affective states or 
motor processes. Obviously, only certain types of motor processes may have an informative 
value in this regard. In the present dissertation we specifically focused on the effects of 
approach and avoidance motor actions on cognitive control processes, as these motor actions 
are closely related to contexts with differing control requirements. Avoidance motor actions 
are habitually performed in difficult or problematic situations that necessitate the heightening 
of cognitive control. Approach motor actions, in contrast, are usually performed under 
favorable conditions that can be dealt with relatively effortlessly. We therefore predicted that 
avoidance motor actions tend to increase the mobilization of cognitive control resources 
relative to approach motor actions, resulting in enhanced cognitive functioning.  
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The present dissertation 
In the four empirical chapters to follow, the effects of approach and avoidance related bodily 
cues on cognitive control processes will be systematically investigated. The general 
prediction underlying this research line is that avoidance-related bodily signals enhance 
cognitive control relative to approach-related bodily signals. We will investigate the effects 
of approach-avoidance bodily cues on different cognitive control functions to corroborate our 
central hypothesis. Furthermore, the mechanisms that underlie performance differences 
resulting from approach and avoidance motor signals will be addressed (Chapter 3). Across 
studies, different operationalizations of approach and avoidance bodily cues are used. In part, 
we rely on well-established manipulations of approach and avoidance such as arm flexion 
and extension (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). In Chapter 4 we will introduce forward and 
backward locomotion as a novel procedure to manipulate approach and avoidance. Finally, 
Chapter 5 examines the effects of overt head movements on cognitive control.  
 Chapter 2 aims at providing first evidence for the regulatory function of approach and 
avoidance motor actions in activating cognitive control processes. We will compare the 
performance of participants executing either approach or avoidance arm movements on tasks 
tapping into different control functions. More specifically, in Study 2.1 performance 
differences on a Stroop (1935) color naming task will be investigated, a task that draws on 
the ability to inhibit automatic response tendencies. We expect that performing an avoidance 
movement will significantly enhance task performance compared to performing an approach 
movement. In Study 2.2 we try to generalize this effect to a different executive function, task 
switching, which refers to the ability to shift focused attention between different tasks. 
Importantly, in this study approach and avoidance motor actions are manipulated within-
subjects. That is, participants alternate between approach and avoidance arm movements 
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while performing the task. Again, we predict that approach and avoidance movements will 
have a differential influence on task performance. 
 Chapter 3 is directed at identifying the mechanisms that underlie the performance 
differences resulting from approach and avoidance bodily signals. We hypothesize that 
approach and avoidance cues may directly regulate the mobilization of energy, such that they 
lead to the up- or down-regulation of cognitive functioning. More specifically, avoidance 
cues are predicted to boost cognitive functioning through the mobilization of cognitive 
resources. Approach cues, in contrast, are predicted to lower the amount of cognitive energy 
mobilized, resulting in poorer cognitive performance. These predictions are tested with a 
cognitive functioning task followed by a cognitive depletion task. To confirm our resource 
allocation account, performance on the cognitive functioning task should be mediated by the 
degree of cognitive depletion on the later task, implying that performance is dependent on the 
expenditure of cognitive resources. More specifically, we expect participants in the avoidance 
condition to display superior performance on the initial switching task compared to the 
approach condition, but at the same time they are predicted to be more prone to resource 
depletion on the second task. Notably, such a mediational effect of resource allocation would 
sketch a more nuanced picture of approach and avoidance bodily signals: Avoidance cues 
might be functional in the short run, as performance benefits from the greater immediate 
allocation of cognitive resources. However, in the long run performance may suffer when 
cognitive resources become depleted.  
In Chapter 4 we turn to a novel embodied manipulation of approach and avoidance 
that more directly taps into the fundamental nature of these action tendencies. Prior research 
has mainly been directed at the effects of approach-avoidance arm movements. However, 
body locomotion may be argued to constitute a more ecologically valid form of approach and 
avoidance behavior, as individuals typically approach desired objects by stepping forward 
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and avoid aversive objects by stepping backward. Study 4.1 introduces forward and backward 
body locomotion as a novel form of manipulating approach and avoidance behavior, and 
investigates the effects of stepping direction on cognitive control processes. Immediately 
after participants stepped either in the forward (approach), backward (avoidance), or 
sideways (control) direction, cognitive functioning is assessed by means of a Stroop (1935) 
task. Study 4.1 aims at further validating the findings of the previous chapters, while at the 
same time establishing a new procedure with higher ecological validity. 
In Chapter 5 we examine the effects of head nodding and head shaking on cognitive 
control processes. Head nodding constitutes the embodied expression of agreement or 
approval, whereas head shaking stands for disagreement or disapproval. Overt head 
movements can be broadly considered a form of approach and avoidance behavior, as head 
nodding is associated with the acquirement of desired outcomes, and head shaking with the 
avoidance of undesired outcomes. Moreover, the processing requirements associated with 
overt head shaking and nodding are similar to those associated with avoidance and approach 
contexts, respectively. More specifically, head shaking is indicative of an undesirable state 
that requires cognitive effort in order to be dissolved. Hence, this bodily signal is associated 
with effortful processing and the need for cognitive control. Head nodding, in contrast, is 
associated with beneficial, optimal conditions that do not require cognitive effort on the part 
of the individual. We predict that unobtrusively inducing participants to nod or shake their 
heads will activate the cognitive modality habitually associated with these movements. 
Consequently, a period of head shaking is predicted to enhance performance on a task 
switching paradigm compared to a period of head nodding. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 the results of the present dissertation will be summarized and 
integrated. Furthermore, implications of the current findings and possible directions for future 
research will be discussed.  
Chapter 1 
 32 
 Please note that each of the four empirical chapters of the present dissertation 
comprises a published or submitted article that can be read independently. As a consequence, 
some minor overlap in terms of theoretical background and methodology may be 
encountered.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Regulating Cognitive Control Through  
Approach-Avoidance Motor Actions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published as: 
Koch, S., Holland, R. W., & van Knippenberg, A. (2008). Regulating cognitive control 
through approach-avoidance motor actions. Cognition, 109, 133-142. 
 
Regulating Cognitive Control 
 35 
Abstract 
In two studies, the regulatory function of approach-avoidance cues in activating cognitive 
control processes was investigated. It was hypothesized that avoidance motor actions, relative 
to approach motor actions, increase the recruitment of cognitive resources, resulting in better 
performance on tasks that draw on these capacities. In Study 2.1, error rates on a verbal 
response mode version of the Stroop task were analyzed. On inconsistent Stroop trials, 
participants in the avoidance condition made significantly fewer errors than those in the 
approach condition. In Study 2.2, performance differences on a task switching paradigm were 
investigated. Crucially, approach and avoidance motor actions were manipulated within 
subjects by alternating between approach and avoidance motor actions on 4 blocks of trials. 
Temporal switching costs were significantly lower while performing an avoidance, compared 
to an approach motor action. These results support our hypothesis that avoidance cues, 
relative to approach cues, lead to improved performance on cognitive control tasks.  
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Introduction 
Human behavior tends to be influenced by environmental cues. These cues are commonly 
assumed to originate from outside the individual like visual or auditory information. A traffic 
light turning red, for instance, signals you to slow down your car. Besides these so-called 
exteroceptive cues, however, the feedback people receive from their own motor behavior has 
been shown to form an important source of information for cognitive functioning and 
behavior (e.g., Neumann & Strack, 2000). This proprioceptive information from bodily states 
such as facial expressions, postures and motor actions seems to play an increasingly 
prominent role in understanding human functioning.  
 Theories of embodiment assign bodily states and motor actions a central role in 
explaining various kinds of psychological phenomena, such as attitude formation, social 
perception and affective reactions (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, 
Kraut-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). Research in the field of embodiment has shown, for instance, 
that the commonly assumed relation between cognition and bodily states, which implies that 
bodily states are usually consequences or executions of cognitive operations, tends to 
underestimate the impact of body feedback. In a classic study within this line of research, 
Strack, Martin and Stepper (1988) demonstrated that smiling may not only be the expression 
of amusement, but also the cause that an event is experienced as amusing. Having 
participants hold a pen with their teeth while watching cartoons, thereby inducing them to 
smile, caused participants to rate the cartoons as funnier. In the present research, we aimed to 
extend the findings in the field of embodiment by demonstrating that motor actions 
associated with approach or avoidance behavior differentially influence performance on 
cognitive tasks, ostensibly due to the different processing requirements these movements 
signal.  
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Embodied cognition and affect 
Bodily states and their effects on affective and cognitive processes have received attention 
from a wide range of research domains (for a review see Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & 
Ruppert, 2003). Motor actions have been shown to influence processes as diverse as 
stereotyping (Mussweiler, 2006), language comprehension (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; cf. 
Zwaan & Taylor, 2006), attitude change (Förster, 2004; Tom, Pettersen, Lau, Burton, & 
Cook, 1991), persuasion (Wells & Petty, 1980), object recognition and categorization 
(Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001), mood and affective states (Duclos et al., 1989; Effron, 
Niedenthal, Gil, & Droit-Volet, 2006; Riskind & Gotay, 1982; Stepper & Strack, 1993; 
Strack et al., 1988; for a review on facial feedback, see Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989), and 
memory for evaluative information (Förster & Strack, 1996; Riskind, 1983; cf. Förster & 
Stepper, 2000).  
The kinds of motor actions studied in prior research range from head shaking and 
nodding to upright or slumped body postures, grasping behavior, facial expressions, and 
overall locomotion. Here a special kind of motor actions is discussed, namely arm motor 
actions related to approach and avoidance. Approach and avoidance behaviors have received 
considerable attention in embodiment research and can be considered some of the most 
fundamental motor actions of the human behavioral repertoire.  
Approach motor actions, such as arm flexion, refer to movements that are enacted in 
order to acquire objects, whereas avoidance motor actions, such as arm extension, are 
performed in order to ward off or reject objects. In general, people tend to approach desired 
objects and to reject undesired ones, so that over time these movements become associated 
with positive, respectively, negative outcomes. As a consequence of this bidirectional link 
between approach/avoidance movements and the valence of objects, people not only reach 
for objects they like, but they also become to like what they reach for. Cacioppo, Priester, and 
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Berntson (1993) were the first to demonstrate that arm flexion leads to a more positive, and 
arm extension to a more negative evaluation of ambiguous stimuli.  
Previous research has also indicated that positive stimuli are faster categorized by 
means of arm flexion responses, whereas negative stimuli are faster categorized by arm 
extension responses (Chen & Bargh, 1999; cf. Neumann & Strack, 2000). Additionally, 
approach arm movements facilitate recall of positive information, whereas avoidance arm 
movements increase memory for negative information (Förster and Strack, 1998). Approach 
and avoidance motor actions have also been found to affect creativity in that arm flexion 
stimulates creative insight relative to arm extension (Friedman & Förster, 2000). Besides 
these more discrete affective and cognitive effects, approach and avoidance behavior can also 
have a more general effect on processing styles and influence actual behavior. More 
concretely, it has been shown that performing arm flexion broadens, and performing arm 
extension narrows the scope of attention (Förster, Friedman, Özelsel, & Denzler, 2006; 
Experiment 2), and that arm flexion, relative to arm extension, increases consumption of tasty 
foods (Förster, 2003). So far, however, no attempt has been made to systematically 
investigate the relation between approach-avoidance motor actions and cognitive control and, 
more specifically, whether these movements differentially influence the recruitment of 
cognitive resources.     
Approach-avoidance and cognitive control 
Successful everyday functioning depends to a great extent on the continuous intervention of 
cognitive control mechanisms that keep our behavior in line with our internal goals and 
intentions. Even relatively simple activities such as driving a car would become a risky 
enterprise if individuals lost their ability to quickly adapt to unforeseen situations or keep 
concentrated on the traffic while concurrently listening to the radio news. While traditional 
conceptualizations of cognitive control assign the control of action to a unitary executive 
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control instance (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Norman & Shallice, 1986; see also Hommel, 
Daum, & Kluwe, 2004), more recent approaches focus more strongly on identifying 
subcomponents of cognitive control and their neurological substrates. Several basic cognitive 
control functions have been distinguished by Smith and Jonides (1999), of which the most 
elementary are the attention and inhibition component, reflecting the ability to focus attention 
on relevant, and away from irrelevant information, and the task management component that 
refers to the scheduling of processes in complex tasks, including the ability to switch focused 
attention between different tasks.  
Supporting evidence for the distributed nature of cognitive control comes from brain 
research. Recent research revealed that cognitive control processes depend on the interaction 
of various brain regions and functional systems (e.g., Goschke, 2003; Gruber & Goschke, 
2004), with the prefrontal cortex playing a central role (e.g., Miller, 2000). While certain 
brain regions seem to be uniquely associated with specific executive functions (e.g., Koechlin 
& Summerfield, 2007; Marklund et al., 2007; Stuss et al., 2002; cf. Miyake, Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000), largely overlapping brain areas tend to be involved in 
various control processes (e.g., Bunge, Ochsner, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 2001; 
Duncan & Owen, 2000; Smith & Jonides, 1999). A common factor in all executive functions 
is, for instance, working memory capacity, as acting in relation to internal goals or plans 
depends on the maintenance of task goals in active memory (Engle & Kane, 2004).     
In general the efficiency of one’s cognitive functioning is influenced by both stable 
individual differences and context-dependent factors, such as fatigue (Lorist, Boksem, & 
Ridderinkhof, 2005). Furthermore, situations differ according to the amount of cognitive 
control they require (Jostmann & Koole, 2007). Whereas some situations can be handled 
effortlessly and routinely, others call for a more deliberate, controlled course of action. 
Generally, it is assumed that especially those situations that are potentially harmful for an 
Regulating Cognitive Control 
 41 
individual require the recruitment of cognitive control, because carefully gauging the 
potential dangers is necessary prerequisite for acting appropriately (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 
see also Mitchell & Phillips, 2007; Schwarz, 1990).  
Given this necessity to regulate the amount of cognitive control devoted to human 
functioning in a given situation, the question arises as to what signals an individual to recruit 
these cognitive control processes. Prior research has provided evidence that both internal 
states and external characteristics of the situation can be indicative of the need to mobilize 
cognitive control. Due to their associative links with problematic environments negative 
affective states, for instance, have been shown to facilitate cautious, controlled responding 
(e.g., Bless & Schwarz, 1999). Characteristics of the task itself can also regulate the 
recruitment of cognitive resources. Kahneman (1973) observed performance improvement 
with increasing task difficulty, suggesting that more cognitive resources are allocated to a 
task when task demands rise. It has been hypothesized that this recruitment of additional 
cognitive resources or mental effort is due to the alerting arousal evoked by difficult tasks 
(Kahneman, 1973; Washburn & Putney, 2001). That is, performance can benefit from an 
“alerted state of mind”, at least at intermediate levels of arousal (see also Strack & Deutsch, 
2004; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). 
In the present research it is proposed that performing motor actions related to 
approach and avoidance may fulfill a regulatory function in activating cognitive control 
processes. We hypothesize that carrying out an avoidance motor action results in greater 
recruitment of cognitive control compared to performing an approach motor action. This 
prediction is based on the idea that avoidance behavior may be indicative of a problematic 
environment that demands a controlled course of action in order to avoid potential harm. 
Individuals confronted with potentially harmful situations cannot rely on behavioral routines, 
but have to focus their attention on the problem at hand in order to react appropriately. 
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Performing an avoidance movement may function as a subtle alert for difficult conditions 
(see Kahneman, 1973), signaling that cognitive control is required in the given situation. 
Approach behavior, in contrast, serves as a signal to safety and opportunity and is, therefore, 
indicative of the absence of threat (cf. Friedman & Förster, 2000). As a consequence, 
behavioral routines or a heuristic processing style may suffice to deal with the situation. In a 
similar vein, the conflict-monitoring hypothesis (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 
2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004) states that adjustments in cognitive control 
processes are initiated by the detection of conflict in information processing. The conflict-
monitoring function is interpreted as part of a broader monitoring system, which monitors 
internal states that signal “a need to intensify or redirect attention or control” (Botvinick et 
al., 2004, p. 539). This broader-purpose system converges with the idea that bodily states or 
motor processes, as one example of internally monitored states, can have a regulatory 
function in cognitive control processes. 
Present research 
To test the prediction that approach and avoidance motor actions differentially influence the 
mobilization of cognitive control, we studied their effects on two different executive 
functions. As outlined above, several subcomponents of cognitive control have been 
identified, two of which we focused on in the present article. A Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; 
Study 2.1) and a task switching paradigm (Study 2.2) were administered to measure the 
inhibition of prepotent responses (attention and inhibition component) and task switching 
ability (task management component), respectively. We chose for these two components of 
cognitive control, because they have been referred to as the most elementary and frequently 
postulated executive processes (Miyake et al., 2000; Smith & Jonides, 1999).  
In summary, we propose that proprioceptive signals resulting from approach and 
avoidance motor actions can regulate the manner in which people process information. More 
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specifically, we hypothesize that avoidance movements, relative to approach movements, 
increase the recruitment of cognitive control resources, resulting in better performance on 
tasks that draw on these capacities like the Stroop task and switching paradigms.   
Study 2.1 
A textbook example for measuring the inhibition of prepotent responses is the Stroop task. 
This task requires responding to one aspect of a stimulus (its color), and ignoring a second 
aspect of the same stimulus (its semantic meaning) that is actually processed more 
automatically. Cognitive control is essential for overcoming (or inhibiting) the strong 
inclination to respond to the more automatically processed dimension of the stimulus. 
Although the Stroop task is not without its critics (e.g., Dishon-Berkovits & Algom, 2000), 
numerous studies have proven its robustness and suitability to contrast automatic with 
controlled aspects of behavior (e.g., Brown, Gore, & Carr, 2002; for a review see MacLeod, 
1991). For the present purpose we tried to ensure high task demands by imposing constraints 
on reaction times. In our view it is crucially important to study Stroop performance under 
time pressure, so that performance differences due to motivational (approach-avoidance) cues 
become more apparent. Without these higher task demands due to reaction time constraints, 
avoidance oriented participants may be inclined to take no risks and ensure correct responses 
at the expense of reaction times. In support of this notion, under conditions of no time 
constraints exteroceptive cues associated with avoidance have been found to slow down 
reaction times on inconsistent Stroop trials relative to exteroceptive cues associated with 
approach (Friedman & Förster, 2005b). Greater task difficulty forms in our view a crucial 
factor in disclosing the increased capacity of avoidance oriented participants that may 
otherwise be obscured by the inclination to avoid errors. 
We expected to find performance differences on the critical, inconsistent Stroop trials, 
but not on the consistent or neutral trials. According to our hypothesis, avoidance cues should 
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increase, and approach cues decrease, the recruitment of cognitive resources. Therefore, we 
expected participants making an avoidance movement to perform significantly better on 
inconsistent Stroop trials than those participants making an approach movement. 
Furthermore, because the effect was predicted to stem from both experimental arm 
conditions, the performance of a no-movement control condition was expected to fall in 
between. Finally, due to the greater task difficulty resulting from the response deadline, 
performance differences should become visible on error rates.  
Method 
Participants. Forty-five students (10 males and 35 females; mean age 22.7 years) at 
the Radboud University Nijmegen took part in this study. They received 2 euros for their 
participation. All participants were native speakers of Dutch.  
Procedure and material. Participants started with the instructions and practice trials of 
a verbal response mode version of the Stroop task. In this task, the color in which a word 
appearing on the screen is written has to be named aloud as fast as possible. Three kinds of 
trials were used in this task: Consistent, inconsistent and filler trials. Consistent trials were 
color words that matched the colors of the ink in which they were written (e.g., the word 
“blue” written in blue ink). Inconsistent trials were trials containing a mismatch between the 
color word and the color of the ink (e.g., “red” written in green). Finally, filler trials consisted 
of non-color words (e.g., “bird”) that were written in different colors. To familiarize 
participants with the task and the apparatus, they first completed 10 practice trials. 
Subsequently, 120 trials in blocks of 30 words were presented. Each block consisted of 10 
consistent, 10 inconsistent and 10 neutral filler trials which were presented in a random order.     
Response latencies were measured by means of a voice key. By imposing a response 
deadline of 800 ms, participants were forced to make a fast response, resulting in heightened 
task difficulty. If participants responded within the response window, the word disappeared 
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and a new word appeared on the screen. If the voice key had not detected a response within 
800 ms, a red X appeared before a new word was presented, indicating that the time limit had 
been exceeded. The experimenter was seated in the back of the cubicle during the task, in 
order to assess the accuracy of the responses.   
Motor actions were manipulated between subjects and participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the three conditions (approach, avoidance, control). To manipulate 
approach and avoidance motor actions, participants performed either arm flexion or extension 
while completing the Stroop task (Cacioppo et al., 1993). In both arm conditions, participants 
had to make the respective movement by means of pressing a foam ball against the table (see 
Figure 2.1).  
 
  A               B  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Panel A: Approach arm position. Panel B: Avoidance arm position. 
 
We added the foam ball to the original procedure in order to ensure that the pressure exerted 
is equal across conditions. In order to unobtrusively induce arm positions and prevent 
participants from theorizing about the meaning of the arm movements they were told that the 
study investigated the effect of physical strain on performance. The experimenter 
demonstrated the required movement without making reference to terms that could 
semantically activate approach or avoidance orientations. In the no-movement control 
condition participants were instructed to rest their hands in their lap while completing the 
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Stroop task. The effortfulness of the arm positions was assessed after completion of the task 
on a 7-point scale ranging from “not at all effortful” to “very effortful”.  
Results 
Error rates. To test our hypotheses, a repeated measures ANOVA with arm 
movement (approach, avoidance, control) as between-subjects factor and type of trial 
(consistent, inconsistent, neutral) as within-subjects factor was performed. The error rates on 
the Stroop task served as dependent variables. The data of 2 participants were excluded from 
the analysis for exceeding the mean error rate by more than 2.5 SDs.1 On 10% of all trials 
participants failed to respond within the response window of 800 ms. The proportion of trials 
exceeding the deadline did not differ between arm movement conditions, F < 1.   
A significant interaction between arm condition and type of trial was found, F(4, 78) 
= 2.92, p < .05, η² = .13. Table 2.1 shows the error data for the 3 arm conditions on the 
consistent, inconsistent and neutral Stroop trials. On inconsistent Stroop trials a significant 
difference in error rates depending on arm condition was observed. Contrast tests revealed 
that participants in the avoidance condition (M = 5.5%, SD = 5.7) made significantly fewer 
errors on inconsistent trials than participants in the approach condition (M = 16.1%, SD = 
10.2), t(40) = 3.7, p < .001.2 The error rate of the control condition fell in between those of 
the two movement conditions (M = 10.5%, SD = 5.8), and differed marginally significantly 
from both the approach condition, t(40) = 1.99, p < .052, and the avoidance condition, t(40) = 
1.86, p < .07. On the error rates of the consistent and neutral Stroop trials no significant 
effects of arm condition were found, both F’s < 1. 
Reaction times. We performed a repeated measures ANOVA on mean reaction times 
on inconsistent, consistent and neutral trials, entering arm condition (approach, avoidance, 
control) as a between-subjects factor. Response latencies of error trials were excluded. In line 
                                                 
1
 Including these data in the analysis did not change the pattern of results in any important way. 
2
 This significant contrast effect replicates the finding of an earlier unpublished study comparing Stroop 
performance solely between approach and avoidance conditions, F(1, 61) = 4.30, p < .05. 
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with our predictions, no significant main effect of, or interaction effect with arm condition 
was found, both F’s < 1. The mean reaction times for the arm conditions on all 3 types of 
trials are displayed in Table 2.1. The only significant effect in this analysis was a main effect 
of trial type, F(2, 39) = 97.68, p < .001, reflecting the standard Stroop interference and 
facilitation effects, both p’s < .001.   
 
Table 2.1 
Error rates and reaction times depending on arm position and trial type (standard deviations in brackets) 
 
                        Avoidance                           Control                               Approach 
Trial type         % error            RT               % error            RT              % error              RT 
Inconsistent 5.5 (5.7)      587 (51)          10.5 (5.8)     611 (46)         16.1 (10.2)     599 (49) 
Consistent 0.3 (0.8)      523 (55)            0.7 (1.2)     534 (33)           1.4 (2.2)       529 (48) 
Neutral 1.2 (2.2)      564 (51)            1.2 (1.7)     571 (46)           1.9 (2.0)       564 (56) 
Note. RT = mean reaction time in milliseconds. 
 
Effort of arm conditions. To test whether the effect of arm condition on error rates is 
mediated by differences in the effortfulness of the arm movements we analyzed the effort 
measure in a one-way ANOVA with arm movement (approach, avoidance, control) as 
between-subjects factor. The approach and avoidance movements were rated as equally 
effortful (M = 4.7 vs. M = 4.5; F < 1). Both the approach and avoidance conditions differed 
significantly from the control condition (M = 1.3; both p’s < .001) in which participants were 
allowed to relax their arms. Furthermore, the effect of arm movement on the error data 
remained significant when the effort measure was entered as covariate in the analysis of the 
error rates. 
Discussion 
Study 2.1 revealed significant performance differences on a Stroop task due to approach and 
avoidance motor actions. Error rates on inconsistent Stroop trials were significantly lower for 
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participants performing an avoidance movement than for those performing an approach 
movement. Performance in the control condition was marginally significantly worse than in 
the avoidance condition and marginally significantly better than in the approach condition, 
suggesting that both experimental arm conditions contributed to the effect.  
The experimental arm conditions did not differ with regard to the effortfulness of the 
arm movements and the effort spent on the movements did not mediate the effect of arm 
condition on the error rates. Additionally, the fact that the control group performed worse 
than the avoidance condition supports the notion that the effect found in the present study is 
not attributable to differences in physical effortfulness of the arm manipulations. If physical 
effort was the critical determinant of performance differences, participants in the no-
movement control condition should outperform both experimental arm conditions as the 
control condition is least effortful. As the latter is not the case, the effect can not be attributed 
to physical effort. 
To further corroborate the observed effect of approach-avoidance motor actions on 
the recruitment of cognitive control processes, we studied their effect on another executive 
control function, task switching, in Study 2.2. Furthermore, we manipulated approach-
avoidance motor actions in a within-subjects design in Study 2.2 by alternating between them 
on the 4 blocks of trials. By doing so, we were able not only to study the differential effect of 
approach-avoidance on executive functioning, but also to gain more insight into the nature of 
these effects. More specifically, we were interested if the expected effects of approach and 
avoidance movements could be switched on and off from block to block. If task performance 
varies in the predicted directions on 4 successive blocks of trials, bodily feedback can be 
interpreted as having a relatively short-lived influence on cognitive functioning that is 
overwritten as soon as the individual receives new relevant bodily feedback. That is, a within-
subjects effect may not only show that approach-avoidance motor actions have an impact on 
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executive functioning, but it also highlights the signaling mechanisms by which these motor 
actions exert their influence.    
Study 2.2 
The second executive function investigated in the present research, task switching, concerns 
the ability to flexibly shift focused attention between different tasks or mental sets (Monsell, 
1996; Smith & Jonides, 1999). More precisely, the switching task administered in the current 
research requires switching or shifting back and forth between different rules to categorize 
stimuli. In order to respond rapidly and accurately on this task it is necessary to keep 
constantly track of the rule that has to be applied on a given trial and activate the appropriate 
stimulus-response mapping. Following Rogers and Monsell (1995), control processes 
involved in task switching were studied by contrasting performance when a task switch was 
required with performance on trials without a task switch. Prior research indicated that task 
switching causes a measurable temporal cost (e.g., Jersild, 1927; Lien, Ruthruff, Remington, 
& Johnson, 2005; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Crucially, in the present research switching 
costs were investigated within subjects, by alternating between approach and avoidance 
motor actions across blocks of trials. Switching costs were expected to be significantly lower 
in the avoidance blocks than in the approach blocks. That is, temporal switching costs were 
predicted to show a zigzag pattern across blocks of trials, with an increase in switching costs 
from avoidance to approach blocks, and a decrease in switching costs from approach to 
avoidance blocks.   
Method 
Participants. Seventy-nine students (16 males and 63 females; mean age 21.2 years) 
at the Radboud University Nijmegen took part in this study. They received 2 euros for their 
participation.  
Procedure and material. We studied the influence of approach and avoidance motor 
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actions on performance on a switching task, varying approach and avoidance within subjects. 
The switching task was an adapted version of the alternating-runs paradigm of Rogers and 
Monsell (1995). The paradigm consisted of two simple categorization tasks that participants 
had to perform alternately in an AABB trial sequence. On each trial a number-letter pair (e.g., 
“M5”) was presented on the screen. On the letter categorization task the letter of the number-
letter pair had to be categorized as a consonant or a vowel. On the number categorization task 
the number of the number-letter pair had to be categorized as even or odd. The location on 
the screen where the character pair was displayed indicated which task had to be performed 
on a given trial (e.g., number task when characters appear in the upper half of the screen, 
letter task when characters appear in the lower half of the screen).  
Those trials on which participants had to switch from one task to the other, that is 
perform a different task than on the preceding trial, were the so-called switching trials. Trials 
on which the same task was performed as on the foregoing trial were so-called repetition 
trials. The performance difference between these two types of trials reflects the cost of task 
switching (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In the case of switching trials, control mechanisms are 
required that suppress the stimulus-response mapping that was appropriate on the previous 
trial and switch to the relevant stimulus-response mapping, which leads to a cost in reaction 
time. The cost of this cognitive control process was investigated in the present study. 
Participants had to respond to the characters by a keypress within a response window 
of 2000 ms. Participants were instructed that both giving an incorrect response and failing to 
respond within the response deadline were considered false, in order to encourage both 
accurate and fast responses. A prolonged response window of 2000 ms was chosen so that 
participants did not experience actual time pressure. A red X was displayed in the center of 
the screen for 200 ms whenever participants gave an incorrect response or exceeded the 
deadline. After each trial a blank screen appeared for 150 ms before the next number-letter 
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pair was presented. 
 Consonants appearing in the stimulus pairs were randomly drawn from the set G, K, 
M, R, vowels from the set A, E, I, U, even numbers from the set 2, 4, 6, 8, and odd numbers 
from the set 3, 5, 7, 9. The relevant character was displayed randomly in the right or left 
position of the pair. 
Before combining the two categorization tasks into a switching paradigm, participants 
practiced each task on its own. In two successive blocks of 40 trials each, only the numbers 
or only the letters were paired with neutral characters (randomly sampled from the set #, *, “, 
%). As in the experimental blocks, the numbers had be classified as even or odd, and the 
letters as a consonant or a vowel. Subsequently, the instructions for the task switching were 
introduced, followed by a practice block of 54 trials.  
Prior to the 4 experimental blocks of the switching task all participants, except for 
those in the control condition, received instructions for the approach or avoidance 
manipulation. Approach and avoidance motor actions were manipulated within subjects by 
alternating between approach and avoidance on the 4 blocks in an ABAB sequence. The 
order of the blocks (i.e., either approach-avoidance-approach-avoidance or avoidance-
approach-avoidance-approach) was counterbalanced. Each of the 4 blocks consisted of 54 
trials. As in Study 2.1 approach and avoidance were manipulated by letting participants 
perform arm motor actions associated with approach or avoidance while concurrently 
carrying out the actual task (Cacioppo et al., 1993; see Figure 2.1). In order to prevent 
participants from theorizing about the meaning of the arm positions they were told that in this 
study the influence of physical strain on categorization processes was investigated. The cover 
story also provided a plausible explanation for changing the movement after each block of 
trials, namely to prevent exhaustion from performing the same movement for too long. None 
of the participants expressed suspicion regarding this cover story, as assessed with an open-
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ended question at the end of the experiment. The instructions for the arm positions were 
provided through the computer program at the beginning of each block of the switching task, 
with pictures illustrating the required arm position for that block. In the written instructions 
accompanying the pictures participants were asked to press a foamball with a constant degree 
of pressure against the table as shown on the pictures.   
At the end of the experiment participants were asked to indicate on two separate self-
report rating scales how effortful both arm positions were (“How effortful was the arm 
position?” from 1 = not at all to 100 = very much).  
Results 
Reaction time (RT) switch costs. RT switch costs were calculated by subtracting the 
mean RT on repetition trials from the mean RT on switching trials (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). 
Beforehand, reaction times deviating more than 2.5 SDs from participants’ mean RT for the 
respective trial type (switch or repetition trials) were removed (2%). Furthermore, RTs from 
error trials were excluded from the analyses. On 2.3% of all trials participants failed to 
respond within 2000 ms. The proportion of trials exceeding the deadline did not differ 
between order conditions, F < 1.  
A repeated measures ANOVA with order of the arm conditions (order 1: avoidance-
approach-avoidance-approach; order 2: approach-avoidance-approach-avoidance; order 3: 
no-movement control condition) as between-subjects factor and block number (block 1 to 
block 4) as within-subjects factor was performed on the RT switch costs.  
No main effect of the within-subjects factor block number (1 - 4) on the RT switch 
costs was found, which means that the overall RT switch costs in the four blocks of trials did 
not differ significantly from each other. The between-subjects factor order condition had also 
no significant main effect, although overall RT switch costs seemed higher in order condition 
1 (M = 384 ms) than in order condition 2 (M = 354 ms). However, neither the main effect of 
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this factor nor the specific contrast of the two experimental order conditions approached 
significance, both F’s < 1.  
In line with our prediction, a significant cubic interaction between order of the arm 
conditions and block number was found, F(2, 76) = 5.43, p < .01, η² = .13. In a next step, the 
three order conditions were analyzed separately. In both experimental order conditions, a 
significant cubic main effect of block number was found. Critically, the direction of the cubic 
effect was reversed depending on the order of the arm conditions (see Figure 2.2). In order 
condition 1, the switch costs on the first and third block, the avoidance blocks, were 
significantly lower (M = 370 ms, SD = 145) than the switch costs on the second and forth 
block, the approach blocks (M = 400 ms, SD = 144), F(1, 30) = 5.43, p < .05. In order 
condition 2, switch costs on the second and forth block, the avoidance blocks, were 
significantly lower (M = 335 ms, SD = 133) than switch costs on the first and third block, the 
approach blocks (M = 373 ms, SD = 140), F(1, 32) = 4.77, p < .05. In the no-movement 
control condition, no effect of block number on RT switch costs was found (M = 373 ms, SD 
= 176), F < 1. 
Error switch costs. Error switch costs were calculated by subtracting the mean error 
rate on repetition trials from the mean error rate on switching trials. On average, error costs 
amounted to 6.2%. No significant main or interaction effects of the factors order of arm 
conditions or block number were found on the error costs, all F’s < 1.  
Effort of arm conditions. The self-reported effortfulness of the arm positions was 
subjected to a repeated measures ANOVA with arm position (approach vs. avoidance) as a 
within-subjects factor. The two arm positions were rated as equally effortful (M = 60 vs. M = 
58, for approach and avoidance, respectively, F < 1).  
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 Figure 2.2. Switch costs (in ms) as a function of arm movement condition and block number. 
 
Discussion 
In Study 2.2 the differential effect of approach and avoidance motor actions on task switching 
ability was investigated. Significant performance differences on this task were found 
depending on the motor action that had to be performed. The temporal cost of switching 
between two tasks was significantly lower when participants concurrently performed an 
avoidance compared to an approach motor action. In the control condition, no performance 
differences were observed across blocks. As in Study 2.1, approach and avoidance arm 
positions were rated as equally effortful.  
General discussion 
In the current studies we explored whether bodily feedback from approach and avoidance 
behavior can have a regulatory function in activating cognitive control processes. It was 
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predicted that avoidance motor actions increase the mobilization of cognitive resources 
relative to approach motor actions. The results we obtained in Study 2.1 and 2.2 with 
cognitive tasks tapping into two different executive functions support this notion. In both 
studies, avoidance cues facilitated performance on cognitive control tasks relative to 
approach cues.  
In Study 2.1, performance differences on a Stroop task were found. Participants 
carrying out an avoidance motor action were better able to inhibit the strong inclination to 
respond to the more automatically processed dimension of stimuli than those in the approach 
condition. Study 2.2 aimed to extend the obtained results to another executive function, task 
switching (Monsell, 1996). Results showed that switching costs were significantly lower 
when participants performed an avoidance compared to an approach motor action. The 
enhanced performance in the avoidance condition reflects the increased ability to flexibly 
shift focused attention between different tasks and activate appropriate stimulus-response 
mappings. In view of the performance of the control condition in these two studies, both 
approach and avoidance motor actions seem to contribute to the effects.  
Safety and danger signals 
With regard to the processes underlying these effects, we argued that approach and avoidance 
movements are indicative of opposing processing requirements, due to their associative links 
with benign as opposed to problematic environments (cf., Friedman & Förster, 2000; Riis & 
Schwarz, 2003). While an approach movement signals safety and opportunity, implying that 
behavioral routines or heuristic processing suffice to deal with the situation, an avoidance 
movement is indicative of a problematic, potentially harmful environment, which requires 
cautious, controlled responding. Although prior research has investigated research questions 
that are derived from these basic assumptions (e.g., the influence of approach-avoidance cues 
on creativity; e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2000), more direct evidence for the proposed 
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difference in information processing has been lacking. By testing the impact of approach and 
avoidance motor actions on executive functioning, we aimed to provide a more direct 
demonstration of the differential influence of approach and avoidance cues on the recruitment 
of cognitive control processes. 
The present results converge with the finding that positive and negative mood (and 
other so-called safety and danger signals) affect processing styles (e.g., Bless & Schwarz, 
1999; Kitamura, 2005). Across a variety of studies it has been shown that positive mood may 
impede executive functions (for a review see Mitchell & Phillips, 2007). Given this parallel 
effects the question arises as to whether the effects of various internal and external safety and 
danger signals are independent of each other. Earlier research on approach-avoidance motor 
actions (e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2000, 2002) and other nonaffective cues (e.g., Soldat, 
Sinclair, & Mark, 1997) suggests that the effects of these signals are not mediated by changes 
in mood states. However, it remains possible that the relation between arm position and 
processing style is mediated by implicit positive and negative affective states (cf. Cacioppo et 
al., 1993) that cannot be properly measured by explicit mood checks. Future research should 
take this possibility into account. 
High task demands 
In the present studies task difficulty was increased by imposing constraints on reaction times. 
In Study 2.1 in particular participants had to perform under challenging conditions. The 
results of the present studies indicate that avoidance oriented participants are capable of 
outperforming approach oriented participants on executive control tasks when task demands 
are high. Imposing time constraints seems to play a critical role in eliciting this performance 
difference between approach and avoidance conditions, as in a previous study without time 
constraints (Friedman & Förster, 2005b) exteroceptive avoidance cues led to slower reaction 
times than exteroceptive approach cues. It seems that the increased capacity in the avoidance 
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condition may be obscured by a slow, error-avoiding response pattern when response time is 
not restricted. Future research should address the question how time constraints affect 
performance of approach vs. avoidance oriented individuals on a Stroop task.  
Nature of bodily feedback 
In prior research the effects of approach and avoidance motor actions have hardly ever been 
studied within subjects (but see Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007), despite the fact 
that such an approach allows a deeper understanding of the mechanisms by which they 
influence our functioning. Study 2.2 of the present article is to our knowledge the first study 
to demonstrate the effect of approach-avoidance motor actions on cognitive processes in a 
within-subjects design, thereby providing important information on the nature of these cues. 
In contrast to conceptual approach-avoidance orientations (e.g., focusing on rewards or 
threats; cf. Friedman & Förster, 2005a) that seem to have a longer lasting effect on human 
behavior, the effects of bodily approach and avoidance cues seem to occur on-line. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that the effects of approach-avoidance cues can be easily 
overwritten by new motivational information.  
Implications and future research 
An important aspect of the present research is the fact that the same effect of arm movements 
on cognitive control was found for two distinct executive functions. Avoidance arm 
movements improved both inhibitory processes and task switching ability relative to 
approach movements. This convergent evidence from different facets of cognitive control 
supports the general argument put forth in the present article. However, as already noted in 
the introduction of this paper, cognitive control constitutes an umbrella term for various 
executive functions (e.g., Smith & Jonides, 1999). Overlapping features of the two executive 
functions studied in the present research may have fostered the consistent effects across tasks. 
In support of this notion, preliminary evidence from neuroimaging studies implies that task 
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management (e.g., switching ability) and attention and inhibition tasks activate largely 
overlapping brain areas (Smith & Jonides, 1999), suggesting that these executive functions 
share a critical common component. However, it is possible that avoidance cues improve 
performance on some control processes but not others. Some executive functions may even 
become impaired by avoidance, and enhanced by approach cues. With respect to the effects 
of mood on cognitive control processes, several executive functions, like updating, planning 
and switching, have been found to be impaired by positive mood (Mitchell & Phillips, 2007). 
Performance on fluency tasks on the other hand (which are frequently used in clinical settings 
to assess aspects of executive function) is generally improved by positive mood (Phillips, 
Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002). As fluency is generally seen as an integral part of creativity 
(e.g., de Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008), these results seem to converge with the finding that 
approach motor actions improve creative processes relative to avoidance motor actions 
(Friedman & Förster, 2000). Therefore future research should examine more closely whether 
similar differential results may be obtained in the domain of approach and avoidance 
movements with functionally more diverse control processes than those presently studied (see 
also Gray, 2001; Riis & Schwarz, 2003).  
Concrete versus diffuse danger signals  
A last point worth mentioning concerns the boundary conditions for mobilizing cognitive 
resources in the face of danger signals. We argued throughout the present article that 
avoidance cues signal the necessity to recruit cognitive control processes, which fosters 
executive functioning. It should be noted, however, that under certain conditions, an 
automatic response to a danger signal may be the more adaptive reaction. Recruiting 
cognitive control in response to a danger signal can even be detrimental. For example, when 
being confronted with a hungry lion or a fast truck heading your way, it would certainly be 
more adaptive to utilize automatic behavioral routines (e.g., flight) instead of accessing 
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cognitive control processes. This, however, raises the question as to what distinguishes 
danger signals that cause a more automatic from those that cause a more controlled response. 
In our view, the crucial factor determining the reaction to a potential threat is the 
concreteness or diffuseness of the source of the threat. When responding to a concrete threat, 
like a fast approaching truck heading your way, an immediate automatic response is 
necessary and likely to occur. However, when experiencing diffuse negative signals 
determining the source and magnitude of the threat and carefully planning a course of action 
is the more adaptive way to deal with the situation. Diffuse signals could for instance 
originate from performing an avoidance motor action, or from being subliminally primed 
with negative information. Diffuse signals can be considered a vague, indefinite sensation 
that something is going wrong, without knowing its cause. Under these circumstances, the 
recruitment of cognitive control processes is essential in order to react appropriately.  
In summary, in the present research it was hypothesized that approach and avoidance 
motor actions are indicative of opposing processing requirements. Avoidance cues signal the 
necessity, and approach cues the absence of the necessity, to recruit cognitive control 
processes. As a consequence, approach and avoidance motor actions should differentially 
influence performance on tasks that draw on these capacities. The findings of the present 
studies support this hypothesis. Across two tasks tapping into different executive functions, 
participants performing avoidance motor actions consistently outperformed those performing 
approach motor actions. Through the greater mobilization of cognitive control, task 
performance seems to get a boost from avoidance cues, whereas approach cues appear to 
impede performance. 
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Abstract 
The present research examined the differential effects of approach and avoidance motor 
actions on cognitive functioning and the processes underlying these performance differences. 
It was hypothesized that avoidance cues lead to superior cognitive performance through the 
enhanced mobilization of cognitive resources. If resource allocation is indeed the underlying 
mechanism, performance should benefit from greater resource allocation in the short run, but 
it may suffer in the long run when cognitive resources become depleted. In support of the 
short-term predictions, Study 3.1 revealed a performance advantage for the avoidance 
condition compared to the approach and control conditions on a cognitive functioning task. In 
Study 3.2, the cognitive functioning task was followed by a persistence task that aimed to 
measure cognitive depletion. The avoidance condition again performed better on the initial 
cognitive control task but subsequently showed greater indications of resource depletion. 
Importantly, the effect of approach-avoidance motor actions on the cognitive functioning task 
was mediated by the degree of depletion, suggesting that superior performance in the 
avoidance condition was achieved by greater expenditure of cognitive resources.  
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Introduction 
A growing body of research documents the effects of bodily states and motor actions on 
human cognition and affect (for a review of the embodiment literature see Barsalou, 
Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003; see also Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal, Barsalou, 
Winkielman, Kraut-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). Body movements as divers as, for instance, overt 
head movements (Wells & Petty, 1980; see also Briñol & Petty, 2003), grasping behavior 
(Tucker & Ellis, 2001), body postures (Riskind & Gotay, 1982), arm movements (e.g., 
Friedman & Förster, 2000), and overall locomotion (Mussweiler, 2006) have been shown to 
influence cognitive and affective states in various ways. 
In research on embodiment effects, two qualitatively different classes of phenomena 
can be distinguished. The first class, which has dominated the empirical literature so far, 
encompasses the bidirectional connections between bodily states and discrete cognitive and 
affective states, that is, effects derived from the assumption that the motor programs 
constitute a core component of modal memory representations of associated cognitive and 
affective states (cf. Barsalou et al., 2003). Niedenthal (2007) reviewed several studies 
illustrating the embodiment of cognition and affect, including for instance the observed 
preference for objects encountered during head nodding as opposed to head shaking (Tom, 
Pettersen, Lay, Burton, & Cook, 1991), the tendency to respond faster to positive stimuli by 
means of an approach movement, and to negative stimuli by means of an avoidance 
movement (Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002; cf. Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 
1993; Chen & Bargh, 1999) and the elicitation of emotional states or emotion-congruent 
evaluations through the adoption of emotion-specific bodily states (e.g., Stepper & Strack, 
1993; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). 
The second class of phenomena goes beyond these discrete effects and reflects the 
effects of bodily states on the regulation of human functioning. A couple of studies have 
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addressed the regulatory function of approach and avoidance arm movements on cognitive 
processing styles, which may stem from learned or congenital associations of these bodily 
states with a particular processing mode. As an example for these processing effects, 
approach movements have been found to broaden the scope of attention, whereas avoidance 
movements tend to narrow the attentional scope (Förster, Friedman, Özelsel, & Denzler, 
2006). Furthermore, due to the facilitating effect of approach motor actions on creative 
insight, and avoidance motor actions on analytical reasoning, these motor actions have been 
related to heuristic and systematic processing styles, respectively (Friedman & Förster, 2000).  
Recently, we examined the effects of approach and avoidance motor actions on the 
regulation of cognitive control processes (Koch, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2008). 
Cognitive control refers to a set of cognitive functions that keep our actions in line with our 
internal goals and intentions (e.g., Hommel, Daum, & Kluwe, 2004; Koechlin & 
Summerfield, 2007; for a taxonomy of executive control functions see Smith & Jonides, 
1999). The results of Koch et al.’s study revealed that motor actions associated with 
avoidance enhanced cognitive functioning relative to motor actions associated with approach, 
as measured by response inhibition and mental set shifting. It was proposed that avoidance 
motor actions may lead to greater mobilization of cognitive resources due to their associative 
links with difficult conditions or aversive stimuli (Schwarz, 2002; cf. Kahneman, 1973).  
Because failure has generally more serious consequences in an avoidance than in an 
approach context, avoidance cues may serve to increase the amount of effort devoted to a 
task. Put differently, individuals may amplify their efforts on critical occasions when 
performance really counts. Yet the mechanisms underlying the observed performance 
differences remain unclear and have not been examined empirically so far. The current 
research aimed at directly testing the role of resource allocation as a possible underlying 
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mechanism of differences in cognitive functioning due to embodied approach-avoidance 
cues.  
It is generally assumed that cognitive resources, like physical resources, form a 
limited source that becomes depleted over time. Performing a cognitively demanding task 
without being able to replenish cognitive resources inevitably leads to a state of cognitive 
depletion (cf., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Engle, Conway, Tuholski, & 
Shisler, 1995; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Muraven, Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006; Vohs, 
Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005). As a consequence of the limited availability of cognitive 
resources, expending greater amounts of mental effort on an initial task will result in lower 
availability of cognitive resources for performing subsequent tasks.  
With these basic assumptions in mind, a closer inspection of how performance 
develops over time in approach and avoidance oriented participants offers the opportunity to 
confirm the proposed role of resource allocation. If the superior performance of avoidance 
oriented individuals on measures of cognitive functioning is the result of greater resource 
allocation, depletion of mental resources should be more apparent in this condition on a 
subsequent task. Importantly, greater indications of resource depletion should mediate the 
effect of approach and avoidance cues on cognitive functioning. That is, participants 
performing avoidance motor actions should perform better on the cognitive control task than 
participants performing approach motor actions due to the greater amounts of cognitive 
resources allocated to task performance, as measured by a depletion task. 
To test this idea, the present research investigated performance differences on a 
cognitive control task, and individual levels of resource depletion subsequent to performing 
this task. More specifically, Study 3.1 aimed at replicating the observed performance gap 
resulting from executing either approach or avoidance related motor actions (cf. Koch et al., 
2008). Study 3.2 looked into the underlying processes by gauging individual levels of 
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resource depletion by means of a persistence task. According to the effort allocation account 
put forward in the current research, the initial performance advantage in the avoidance 
condition may be followed by impaired performance on the persistence task, as resource 
depletion should be more apparent in the condition that allocated more cognitive resources to 
the initial control task. Crucially, taking the persistence measure as an index of cognitive 
resources allocated to the initial task, the effect of approach and avoidance movements on the 
cognitive control task should be mediated by the degree of resource allocation.       
Study 3.1 
A first prediction that can be derived from the hypothesis that avoidance oriented participants 
allocate more mental effort or cognitive resources to a task than approach oriented 
participants concerns performance differences in the short run. In a recent study avoidance 
cues were found to enhance cognitive functioning relative to approach cues, as measured by 
performance on a Stroop task and a task switching paradigm (Koch et al., 2008). To show the 
robustness of these findings, Study 3.1 aimed at replicating the effect of approach and 
avoidance movements on task switching ability in a between-subjects design. More 
concretely, we predicted that performing avoidance arm movements would lead to superior 
task switching performance than performing approach arm movements.     
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-seven students (35 females, 22 males; mean age = 23.3 years) at the Radboud 
University Nijmegen, The Netherlands, participated in this study in return for course credit or 
2 euros. 
Procedure and material  
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room equipped with a computer. A task 
switching paradigm, adapted from Rogers and Monsell (1995; see also Koch et al., 2008), 
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was administered. Task switching performance is assumed to reflect ongoing cognitive 
control mechanisms, indexing an individuals’ ability to flexibly adapt to changing demands.  
The task consisted of two simple categorization rules that had to be applied to 
number-letter pairs in an AABB trial sequence. Number-letter pairs (e.g. “M5”) appeared on 
the screen one by one. The first categorization rule required categorizing the letter of the 
number-letter pair as a consonant or a vowel. The second categorization rule required 
categorizing the number of the number-letter pair as even or odd. By which rule the number-
letters pairs had to be categorized on a given trial was determined by the location on the 
screen where the stimulus pairs were displayed (e.g., number task when characters appear in 
upper half of the screen, letter task when characters appear in lower half).  
Those trials on which participants had to apply a different categorization rule than on 
the preceding trial (i.e. switch from one rule to the other), were the so-called switching trials. 
Repetition trials, in contrast, referred to those trials on which the same categorization rule 
was used as on the foregoing trial. The temporal cost of switching from one rule to the other 
is operationalized as the difference in reaction times between these two types of trials (Rogers 
& Monsell, 1995). As switching trials require a switch to the currently appropriate stimulus-
response (S-R) mappings, while keeping the previously appropriate S-R mappings on hold, a 
cost in reaction time occurs. The temporal cost of this cognitive control mechanism was the 
focus of the present study. 
Stimulus pairs had to be categorized by pressing one of two specified buttons on the 
keyboard. Participants were informed that both responding incorrectly and failing to respond 
within a response deadline of 2000 ms were considered wrong, in order to encourage 
participants to be both accurate and fast. Incorrect responses and deadline violations were 
indicated by a red X displayed in the center of the screen for 200 ms. Each trial ended with a 
blank screen displayed for the duration of 150 ms. 
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Vowels appearing in the stimulus pairs were randomly drawn from the set A, E, I, U , 
consonants from the set G, K, M, R, odd numbers from the set 3, 5, 7, 9, and even numbers 
from 2, 4, 6, 8. The position (right or left) of the relevant character of the stimulus pair was 
randomly determined.    
Prior to the experimental trials of the switching task, the two categorization rules were 
practiced separately. On the first two blocks (consisting of 40 trials each), only the numbers 
or only the letters were paired with neutral characters (from the set #, *, “, %). The numbers 
or letters had to be classified according to the same categorization rules as in the 
experimental blocks. Next, participants received the instructions for the task switching and 
completed a practice block.  
After the practice block the approach and avoidance manipulations were introduced. 
Participants were instructed to adopt certain arm positions that have been found to be 
associated with approach or avoidance behavior (Cacioppo et al., 1993). In the avoidance 
condition arm extensor contraction was induced by having participants press downward on a 
table. Conversely, in the approach condition arm flexor contraction was induced by having 
participants press upward on a table. The respective movement was enacted with the non-
dominant arm while concurrently carrying out the actual task that comprised 4 blocks of 54 
trials each. In order to keep the exerted pressure equal across groups, the respective 
movements had to be performed by means of pressing a foam ball against the table (see Koch 
et al., 2008). Participants in the control group were asked to rest their non-dominant hand in 
their lap during the task.  
After completion of the switching task, participants were asked to provide self-report 
ratings of their current mood state (“How do you feel right now?” from 1 = very negative to 
100 = very positive) and level of mental and physical fatigue (“How mentally/physically 
depleted do you feel right now?” from 1 = not at all to 100 = very much). Furthermore, the 
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effortfulness of the (approach or avoidance) arm position (“How effortful was the arm 
position adopted during the task?” from 1 = not at all to 100 = very much) and demographic 
variables were assessed. Finally, participants were paid, thanked, and debriefed. 
Results 
Task switching ability 
Reaction time (RT) switch costs were calculated by subtracting the mean RT on repetition 
trials from the mean RT on switching trials (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Beforehand, reaction 
times deviating more than 2.5 SDs from a participants’ mean RT for the respective trial type 
(switch or repetition trials) were removed (2.4%). Furthermore, RTs from error trials were 
excluded from the analyses.1 On 2% of all trials participants failed to respond within 2000 
ms. The proportion of trials exceeding the deadline did not differ between arm conditions, F 
< 1.  
A one-way ANOVA with arm movement (approach vs. avoidance vs. control) as a 
between-subjects factor was performed on the RT switch costs. A significant main effect of 
arm movement emerged, F(1, 54) = 4.02, p = .02, η² = .09. Contrast tests revealed that 
participants in the avoidance condition (M = 225 ms, SD = 102) performed significantly 
better than participants in the approach (M = 297 ms, SD = 97; t(54) = 2.09, p = .04) and 
control condition (M = 316 ms, SD = 123; t(54) = 2.55, p = .01). RT switch costs in the latter 
two conditions did not differ significantly from each other, F < 1. 
Effort of arm condition 
The self-reported effortfulness of the arm movements was subjected to a one-way ANOVA 
with the 2 experimental arm conditions (approach vs. avoidance) as a between-subjects 
factor. The two arm positions were rated as equally effortful (M = 64 vs. M = 62, for 
approach and avoidance, respectively, F < 1).  
                                                 
1
 Error switch costs, calculated by subtracting the mean error rate on repetition trials from the mean error rate on 
switching trials, amounted to 10%. No significant effect of arm condition on error switch costs was found, F < 
1. 
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Self-report ratings 
Self-report ratings of mood, and mental and physical depletion did not significantly differ 
between arm conditions, all F’s < 1.   
Discussion 
In Study 3.1 the effects of approach-avoidance motor actions on task switching ability were 
investigated. Task switching gauges the cognitive ability to flexibly adapt to changing 
requirements and forms a measure of cognitive control. In line with earlier findings (Koch et 
al., 2008), avoidance oriented participants outperformed participants in the approach and 
control conditions on this task.  
In a next step, we aimed to provide empirical evidence for the effort allocation 
account put forth in the present article. Although cognitive functioning seems to benefit from 
avoidance cues in the short run as the results of Study 3.1 revealed, performance on 
subsequent tasks may be impaired if the initial superior performance is accomplished by 
greater resource allocation. To corroborate the proposed mechanism, resource depletion was 
gauged with a persistence task in Study 3.2.  
Study 3.2 
In Study 3.2 performance on two successive tasks was investigated. First the same cognitive 
control task as in Study 3.1 was administered, under either arm flexion (i.e. approach) or arm 
extension (i.e. avoidance) conditions (Cacioppo et al., 1993). In line with Study 3.1, it was 
predicted that avoidance oriented participants would outperform approach oriented 
participants on this task. Next participants worked on an unrelated task for a few minutes in 
order to override the effects of the approach-avoidance manipulation. Then a second task was 
administered that measured depletion of cognitive resources. On this second task, approach 
and avoidance cues were no longer manipulated. Depletion was operationalized as the time 
spent on a persistence task, with less persistence being indicative of greater depletion (e.g., 
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Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 2006; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Vohs et 
al., 2005). According to our general argument, the former avoidance condition was predicted 
to show greater indications of cognitive depletion than the former approach condition on this 
second task. Crucially, to corroborate the role of resource allocation as the mediating 
mechanism, it was hypothesized that approach-avoidance cues affect performance on the 
cognitive control task through the amount of effort dedicated to task performance, as 
measured by the degree of depletion on the persistence task. More precisely, the avoidance 
condition was predicted to outperform the approach condition on the measure of cognitive 
control due to the greater amounts of cognitive resources allocated to this task.  
Method 
Participants  
Sixty-two students (45 females, 17 males; mean age = 22.2 years) at the Radboud University 
Nijmegen, The Netherlands, participated in this study in return for course credit or 2 euros.  
Procedure and material 
Task switching ability. For the first part of Study 3.2, exploring the effect of approach-
avoidance motor actions on task switching ability, we employed the same task used in Study 
3.1, except that participants completed 3 blocks of 54 trials instead of 4 blocks. During the 
task, half of the participants enacted an approach, and the other half an avoidance movement 
with their non-dominant arm.  
Persistence measure. After having worked on an unrelated task for a few minutes to 
override the approach-avoidance manipulation, the second experimental task was 
administered. In this second phase of the experiment, individual levels of resource depletion 
were gauged by means of a persistence task. The task was introduced as a search puzzle. 
Participants were instructed to find the difference between two images depicted on the 
computer screen (see Figure 3.1). In fact there was no solution to the puzzle as both images 
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were identical. Following Baumeister et al. (1998), the time participants persisted in trying to 
solve the unsolvable puzzle served as the measure of resource depletion, with less persistence 
(i.e. quitting earlier) being indicative of greater depletion.  
Self-report ratings. The same self-report measures as in Study 3.1 were employed.   
 
 
Figure 3.1. Unsolvable search puzzle consisting of two identical pictures (used with kind permission of 
PLAYMOBIL®). 
 
Results 
Task switching ability 
Reaction time (RT) switch costs were calculated the same way as in Study 3.1 by subtracting 
the mean RT on repetition trials from the mean RT on switching trials (Rogers & Monsell, 
1995). Beforehand, reaction times deviating more than 2.5 SDs from a participants’ mean RT 
for the respective trial type (switch or repetition trials) were removed (1.4%). Furthermore, 
RTs from error trials were excluded from the analyses.2 On 3.4% of all trials participants 
failed to respond within the response window of 2000 ms. The proportion of trials exceeding 
the deadline did not differ between arm conditions, F < 1.  
An independent-samples t-test on the RT switch costs for the two arm conditions was 
performed. A significant difference in switch costs depending on arm condition was found, 
                                                 
2
 Error switch costs amounted on average to 8%. No significant main effect of arm condition was found on the 
error costs, F < 1.    
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t(60) = 2.56, p = .01, η² = .10. As in Study 3.1, switching costs were significantly lower in the 
avoidance (M = 359 ms, SD = 101) compared to the approach condition (M = 430 ms, SD = 
116).    
Persistence measure 
The time spent on the search puzzle, or puzzle time, was analyzed with a one-way ANOVA, 
with arm movement on the initial task (approach vs. avoidance) as a between-subjects factor. 
A significant main effect of arm condition was found, F(1, 60) = 4.54, p = .03, η² = .07. 
Participants in the former avoidance condition quit the puzzle significantly earlier (M = 122 s, 
SD = 47.31) than participants in the former approach condition (M = 161 s, SD = 51.38).  
Mediation effect. When puzzle time was entered as a covariate in the analysis of 
switch costs on the initial task, the effect of arm condition was no longer significant, p > .05, 
suggesting that the effect of arm condition on performance on the initial task was mediated 
by the amount of effort allocated to this task (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  
To explore the indirect effect of approach-avoidance motor actions on task switching 
ability through effort allocation, a bootstrapping analysis was performed (Preacher & Hayes, 
2004) with arm movement (approach vs. avoidance) as independent (predictor) variable, RT 
switch costs as dependent (criterion) variable, and puzzle time as the proposed mediating 
variable.3 Figure 3.2 depicts the mediational model and reports the standardized βs. The 95% 
confidence interval obtained from this analysis ranged from 0.006 to 0.2080, indicating that 
the mediated effect was significantly different from zero at p < .05 (two-tailed; 3000 
bootstrap resamples).     
 
                                                 
3
 The bootstrapping procedure can be applied to small samples with greater confidence and should be preferred 
over alternative procedures such as the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) when sample sizes are small (Preacher & Hayes, 
2004). 
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Figure. 3.2. Path analyses illustrating the mediating role of puzzle time on the relation between approach-
avoidance movements and switch costs. The numbers indicate standardized βs. The parenthetic number 
represents the relation between approach-avoidance movements and switch costs before controlling for puzzle 
time. * p < .05. 
 
Effort of arm conditions. The self-reported effortfulness of the arm positions was 
subjected to a one-way ANOVA with arm position (approach vs. avoidance) as a between-
subjects factor. The two arm positions were rated as equally effortful (M = 58 vs. M = 62, for 
approach and avoidance respectively, F < 1).  
Self-report ratings. Self-report ratings of mood, and mental and physical depletion did 
not significantly differ between arm conditions, all F’s < 1.  
Discussion 
In Study 3.2 the effects of approach-avoidance motor actions on two successive tasks were 
explored. Replicating the findings of Study 3.1, participants in the avoidance condition 
outperformed those in the approach condition on an initial task measuring an executive 
control function (i.e. task switching ability). Performance on a subsequent persistence task 
revealed a reversed pattern: Participants who engaged in an avoidance motor action during 
the initial task showed less persistence (i.e., greater indications of resource depletion) on the 
second task than those who engaged in an approach motor action during the initial task. 
Importantly, the differential effect of approach-avoidance motor actions on task switching 
ability was mediated by the depletion measure, which underpins the notion that approach-
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avoidance motor actions regulate the amount of effort or cognitive resources devoted to a 
(cognitively demanding) task. Avoidance cues seem to signal the need to allocate effort to a 
task, which improves performance in the short run. However, performance on subsequent 
tasks may suffer when cognitive resources become depleted.  
General Discussion 
In the current research the processes underlying performance differences in approach versus 
avoidance oriented individuals were investigated. Previous research provided evidence that 
motor actions associated with avoidance, as opposed to approach, improve performance on 
tasks that require the intervention of cognitive control processes, such as response inhibition 
or flexible adaptation to changing demands (Koch et al., 2008).  
The present two studies replicated the performance difference due to approach and 
avoidance motor actions. Additionally Study 3.2 provided insight into the underlying 
mechanisms. More concretely, this study is the first to provide evidence that the performance 
increments in avoidance oriented participants may be the result of greater amounts of mental 
effort allocated to the task, as these participants showed greater indications of resource 
depletion on a persistence task that was administered subsequently. Importantly, supporting 
the notion that performance differences arose from differences in effort allocation, the degree 
of depletion on the persistence task mediated the effect of approach-avoidance motivational 
cues on task switching ability.  
The choice for the persistence measure as the second task was based on two 
considerations. First, persistence tasks form a well-established measure of cognitive depletion 
and have frequently been used in prior research as an indicator for the availability of 
cognitive resources (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 2006; Muraven et al., 1998; 
Vohs et al., 2005). Second, the persistence measure is conceptually distinct from the 
cognitive control task that is administered initially. The finding that performance on one task 
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influences performance on a second, conceptually unrelated task further corroborates the 
notion that various cognitive control functions draw on a common, limited resource (see 
Baumeister et al., 1998). 
The prediction that approach and avoidance movements may regulate the amount of 
cognitive resources mobilized in a given situation was based on the observation that 
avoidance bodily feedback is usually associated with aversive, undesirable events. Therefore 
avoidance motor actions may signal the need to redirect attention and intensify cognitive 
efforts in order to avoid negative consequences (cf. Schwarz, 2002). In other words, 
avoidance bodily feedback may foster the mobilization of cognitive resources due to its 
association with difficult conditions. By relating embodied states to the amount of energy 
mobilization, we tried to go beyond the investigation of discrete cognitive and affective 
effects that has prevailed in embodiment research so far, and address the regulatory 
capabilities of body movements instead. 
Given the regulatory implications of approach and avoidance cues found in the current 
studies, the question arises whether repeatedly inducing avoidance motivational orientations 
may provide a means to delay the moment that individuals are overcome by a state of 
cognitive depletion. For the specific question studied in the present research it was critically 
important not to trigger avoidance orientations during the second task of Study 3.2, as this 
second measure aimed at gauging resource depletion stemming from the first task. However, 
it is conceivable that having participants perform approach and avoidance motor actions 
during the second task as well, will boost performance in the avoidance condition again, 
obscuring the fact that greater amounts of effort have already been expended until a critical 
level of remaining cognitive capacity is reached.  
A related issue concerns the role of approach and avoidance motivational cues in 
overcoming an existing state of cognitive depletion. Prior research has mainly focused on 
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external cues as a way to counteract depletion, such as priming of a persistent person 
exemplar (Martijn et al., 2006). Yet motoric cues associated with persistence, such as 
crossing the arms, have likewise been shown to increase perseverance within achievement 
settings (Friedman & Elliot, 2008). Possibly avoidance, as opposed to approach, motoric cues 
are also capable of counteracting or overcoming (moderate levels of) cognitive depletion. It is 
for instance conceivable that avoidance cues may lead to the mobilization of cognitive 
reserves that would otherwise be inaccessible. These issues and others should be addressed in 
future research to further increase the understanding of the cognitive consequences of 
approach and avoidance motivational orientations. 
In summary, the present studies provide evidence for the proposed resource allocation 
account of performance differences in approach and avoidance oriented individuals. 
Furthermore, the current findings suggest that avoidance motivational orientations, although 
very functional in the short run, may seriously impair cognitive functioning in the longer run. 
Due to the greater immediate expenditure of cognitive resources, subsequent performance 
seems to suffer from the lower residual cognitive capacity.  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Body Locomotion as Regulatory Process: 
Stepping Backward Enhances Cognitive Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published as: 
Koch, S., Holland, R. W., Hengstler, M., & van Knippenberg, A. (2009). Body locomotion as 
regulatory process: Stepping backward enhances cognitive control. Psychological Science, 20, 
549-550. 
 
  
 
Body Locomotion 
 83 
Extended Abstract  
Due to the natural tendency to approach desired objects and to avoid aversive ones, approach 
and avoidance movements tend to be strongly associated with beneficial and problematic 
contexts, respectively. As a consequence, the mere performance of approach and avoidance 
movements – such as arm flexion and arm extension - tends to elicit corresponding cognitive 
and affective reactions, such as liking for objects or the motivation to eat or drink. Because 
problematic contexts require enhanced cognitive control in order to ward off negative 
consequences, performing avoidance movements has also been shown to enhance the 
recruitment of cognitive control. Previous research focused primarily on the effects of 
approach and avoidance arm movements, although body locomotion seems a more natural and 
ecologically valid form of approach and avoidance behavior. In everyday life, individuals 
typically approach desired objects by stepping forward and avoid aversive objects by stepping 
backward. Hence, we expected stepping backward to increase the recruitment of cognitive 
control. To test this prediction, cognitive functioning was gauged by means of a Stroop task 
immediately after participants took several steps in the forward (approach), backward 
(avoidance), or sideways (control) direction. The Stroop task requires naming the color of 
words while ignoring their semantic meaning that is actually processed more automatically. 
Cognitive control is required to override the tendency to respond to the semantic meaning and 
instead respond to the color. Stepping backward significantly improved performance on this 
task compared to stepping forward or sideways, such that response speed to words that 
required the inhibition of automatic response tendencies were significantly enhanced. In view 
of these results, backward locomotion appears to be a powerful trigger to mobilize cognitive 
resources.  
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Introduction 
Theories of embodiment have recognized the significance of the motor system in influencing 
cognitive and affective processes (e.g., Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003). 
Specific movements may become so strongly associated with a cognitive or affective state 
that their mere initiation elicits the corresponding state. Among these movements, approach 
and avoidance arm movements are the most widely studied. Arm flexion is habitually used 
for pulling something towards oneself, and arm extension for pushing something away. As a 
result, these movements have become associated with positive and negative outcomes, 
respectively, and performing them tends to invoke corresponding reactions. Such approach 
and avoidance arm movements influence, for instance, individuals’ liking for objects 
(Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993), reaction latencies to positive and negative stimuli 
(Chen & Bargh, 1999), and even motivation to eat or drink (Förster, 2003).  
 Recently, we showed that approach and avoidance arm movements also regulate the 
recruitment of cognitive control (Koch, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2008). Avoidance 
movements are usually performed in the context of aversive or problematic conditions that 
require enhanced control in order to focus on relevant information and to ward off negative 
consequences (e.g., Schwarz, 2002; cf. Kahneman, 1973). Thus, such movements are 
associated with the mobilization of cognitive resources. In line with this account, performing 
avoidance arm movements increased cognitive control relative to performing approach arm 
movements (Koch et al., 2008). 
In the most fundamental and literal sense, approach refers to decreasing, and 
avoidance to increasing, the physical distance between the self and the outside world. In our 
view, body locomotion most purely taps into this fundamental nature of approach and 
avoidance. In everyday life, individuals typically approach desired stimuli by stepping 
forward and avoid aversive stimuli by stepping backward. Hence, it may be argued that body 
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locomotion constitutes the purest and most ecologically valid form of approach and 
avoidance behavior. The idea that body locomotion may trigger approach and avoidance 
orientations has, so far, not been tested. 
The research described here aimed to test the role of body locomotion in the 
recruitment of control processes. Because of the conditioned link between stepping backward 
and aversive situations, we expected that stepping backward would increase the recruitment 
of cognitive control relative to stepping forward. To test this prediction, we gauged cognitive 
functioning by means of a Stroop (1935) task immediately after a participant stepped in one 
direction. The Stroop task requires naming the color in which stimulus words are printed 
while ignoring their semantic meaning, which is actually processed more automatically than 
the color. Cognitive control is required to override the tendency to respond to the semantic 
meaning and instead respond to the color. 
Study 4.1 
Method 
In a study ostensibly on motion and language, 38 native Dutch-speaking university 
undergraduates (8 males, 30 females; mean age = 21.5 years) at Radboud University 
Nijmegen completed eight blocks of a Stroop task. In this task, the color in which stimulus 
words were written had to be named as quickly as possible. Stimulus words were color and 
noncolor words written in different ink colors. In consistent trials, the ink color matches the 
semantic meaning of the stimulus word (e.g., “blue” written in blue ink); in inconsistent 
trials, the ink color and stimulus word are mismatched (e.g., “red” written in blue ink). Filler 
trials used noncolor words. Responding in the Stroop task is generally facilitated on 
consistent trials and impeded on inconsistent trials, relative to responses to noncolor filler 
words. On the critical, inconsistent trials, performance depends on the ability to suppress the 
natural tendency to read the word.    
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Each block of the Stroop task comprised 12 trials (4 consistent, 4 inconsistent, and 4 
filler trials) that were presented in a random-like order. Before each block of trials, 
participants received instructions via the computer program to take four steps in one of four 
directions: forward (approach), backward (avoidance), left (control), or right (control). 
Stepping direction was manipulated within subjects, with each direction occurring twice. The 
order of the stepping directions was randomly determined, with the restriction that all four 
directions were used before a direction was repeated. The Stroop task was run on a laptop 
computer mounted on a mobile, height-adjustable cart, enabling completion of the Stroop 
task in a standing position. When executing the specified steps, participants moved the cart 
along with them.  
Response latencies were measured via voice key, and response accuracy was recorded 
by the experimenter. Participants were unaware of the actual purpose of the experiment.   
Results 
A 3 (Type of Trial: consistent, inconsistent, filler) x 3 (Stepping Direction: forward, 
backward, sideways) repeated measures analysis of variance was performed on response 
latencies (reaction times after left and right steps did not differ significantly, F < 1). 
Beforehand, reaction times from error trials (1.9%) and those deviating more than 2.5 
standard deviations from a participant’s mean reaction time (3.5%) were removed. In addition 
to the standard Stroop facilitation and inhibition effects, F(2, 74) = 78.14, prep > .99, ηp2 = 
.68, there was a significant Trial Type x Stepping Direction interaction, F(4, 148) = 7.65, prep 
= .99, ηp2 = .17. On inconsistent trials, reaction times were significantly faster after stepping 
backward (M = 676 ms, SD = 83) than after stepping forward (M = 712 ms, SD = 95), t(37) = 
4.67, prep = .99, d = 0.79, or sideways (M = 702 ms, SD = 83), t(37) = 3.60, prep = .99, d = 
0.58 (see Figure 4.1). Reaction times after stepping forward did not differ significantly from 
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reaction times after stepping sideways, p > .27. On consistent and filler trials, Stepping 
Direction did not have a significant effect, ps > .08. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Reaction times (in ms) on inconsistent, consistent and filler trials as a function of stepping direction. 
Error bars indicate standard errors of the means. 
 
Conclusion 
Forward and backward body locomotion constitutes a pure form of approach and avoidance 
behavior with high ecological validity. Corroborating previous evidence that avoidance cues 
facilitate the recruitment of cognitive control, the current study showed that stepping 
backward significantly enhanced cognitive performance compared to stepping forward or 
sideways. Considering the effect size, backward locomotion appears to be a very powerful 
trigger to mobilize cognitive resources. Thus, whenever you encounter a difficult situation, 
stepping backward may boost your capability to deal with it effectively. 
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Abstract 
Two studies tested the prediction that head shaking and head nodding differentially influence 
the recruitment of cognitive control. Head nodding is an embodied signal that stands for 
approval, whereas head shaking is indicative of disapproval. In contrast to approval, 
disapproval constitutes an undesirable state that requires greater cognitive effort on the part of 
the individual. It was predicted that merely performing head shaking or head nodding would 
activate the cognitive modality habitually associated with them, i.e., greater recruitment of 
cognitive control processes when individuals are induced to shake, relative to nod, their 
heads. In support of this notion, a period of head shaking resulted in lower error rates on a 
subsequent cognitive control task than head nodding. Whereas previous studies showed that 
overt head movements influence attitudinal processes, the present findings suggest that these 
movements may also regulate basic processes related to the allocation of cognitive resources. 
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Introduction 
A variety of motor actions tend to be deeply rooted in the customs of a culture in the form of 
gestures. This non-verbal mode of communication is capable of conveying a message just as 
unequivocally as spoken words do. For instance, almost all over the world a spoken “yes” can 
simply be replaced by moving one’s head vertically up and down to show one’s approval, 
whereas “no” or disapproval can be communicated non-verbally by shaking one’s head from 
side to side. The ability to express agreement and disagreement by means of head movements 
is acquired early in life (e.g., Guidetti, 2005), and already at age 4 children are able to infer 
the credibility of a target person from the affirming or disaffirming head movements of 
bystanders (Fusaro & Harris, 2008). 
However, besides this communicative function to the outside world, gestures and 
other motor actions can also have an impact on the person who performs the action. As 
numerous studies in the domain of embodiment have proven, merely performing a body 
movement may elicit the cognitive or affective state the movement has become associated 
with (for a review of the embodiment literature see Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 
2003; see also Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Kraut-Gruber, & Ric, 
2005). For instance, head shaking and head nodding have been shown to be not only the 
expression of agreement or disagreement, but unobtrusively inducing individuals to nod or 
shake their heads while listening to a stance can also cause greater agreement or 
disagreement with this stance (Wells & Petty, 1980). 
Besides the effect of overt head movements on the degree of agreement with 
persuasive messages, head shaking and nodding have also been found to directly shape 
preferences for objects. Individuals tend to show a preference for objects encountered during 
head nodding as opposed to head shaking (Tom, Pettersen, Lau, Burton, & Cook, 1991), and 
compatible head movements tend to strengthen the evaluation of valenced objects (i.e. 
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nodding increases liking for positive objects, and shaking increases disliking for negative 
objects; Förster, 2004). Furthermore, in line with the notion that head nodding and head 
shaking are generally associated with favorable and unfavorable reactions, respectively, 
nodding has been found to facilitate memory for positive words, whereas shaking facilitates 
memory for negative words (Förster & Strack, 1996). 
Prior research has mainly addressed the effects of overt head movements on 
attitudinal processes. Unlike these earlier approaches, the current studies investigated the 
influence of head movements on more general, regulatory processes. More specifically, we 
tested the assumption that head shaking and head nodding may differentially influence 
cognitive control processes. Cognitive control refers to a set of cognitive functions that are 
crucial for efficient information processing, such as the ability to direct or withdraw attention 
or switch focused attention between different tasks (e.g., Smith & Jonides, 1999).  
The assumption that head shaking and nodding may differentially influence cognitive 
control processes is based on accumulating evidence from different lines of research. First, 
nodding and shaking the head can be considered a form of approach and avoidance behavior 
(Förster, 2004). People habitually nod their heads to indicate approval and hence this 
movement is strongly associated with the fostering or acquirement of desired end states. Head 
shaking, in contrast, is habitually performed to indicate disapproval and therefore stands for 
the avoidance of undesired outcomes. Recent research provided evidence that bodily cues 
associated with approach and avoidance may fulfill a regulatory function in the recruitment 
of cognitive control (Koch, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2008). Arm extension, a habitual 
avoidance movement, enhanced cognitive functioning relative to arm flexion, a habitual 
approach movement. Due to their associative links with difficult or problematic conditions, 
avoidance cues may serve to increase the amount of effort devoted to a task in order to ward 
off negative consequences (Schwarz, 2002; see also Koch, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 
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2009a). Assuming that head nodding and head shaking are similarly associated with approach 
and avoidance, respectively, one would expect head shaking to enhance cognitive functioning 
relative to head nodding.    
Second, Briñol and Petty (2003) proposed a self-validation account for the various 
effects of overt head movements on attitudinal processes, stating that these movements 
differentially influence the confidence a person has in his own thoughts (see also Petty, 
Briñol, & Tormala, 2002). That is, head movements serve as an internal cue to the validity of 
one’s thoughts, with head nodding indicating greater confidence than head shaking (see also 
Epley & Gilovich, 2001). Importantly, according to Gilbert (1991; see also Gilbert, Tafarodi, 
& Malone, 1993), believing or accepting the validity of an assertion is a rather automatic and 
effortless process, whereas rejecting an assertion always requires more time and effort. It is 
characteristic of the human mind to initially accept as true everything it tries to comprehend, 
and only in a second, more effortful step, the initial belief can be rejected. Head nodding, as 
the embodied expression of agreement or belief, may hence be associatively linked with an 
automatic, effortless fashion of information processing. Conversely, head shaking constitutes 
an embodied expression of disagreement or disbelief and may therefore be associatively 
linked with an effortful, deliberate processing style requiring more cognitive control. 
Additional evidence for the notion that disagreement is an effortful process comes 
from the persuasion literature. Resistance to persuasion has been shown to be a self-
regulatory process that requires and consumes cognitive resources (Burkley, 2008; Wheeler, 
Briñol, & Hermann, 2007). For instance, depleted participants were found to be more easily 
persuaded by weak arguments than non-depleted participants (Wheeler et al., 2007), and 
resisting a persuasive message impairs performance on a subsequent self-control task 
(Burkley, 2008). Again, considering the common finding within the embodiment literature 
that motor actions tend to elicit the cognitive processes or processing styles they are 
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associated with (e.g., Barsalou et al, 2003; see also Förster, Friedman, Özelsel, & Denzler, 
2006), it seems likely that head shaking and head nodding may have a differential influence 
on the way information is processed. Because head shaking tends to be performed in 
situations that generally require a greater amount of cognitive control, the mere act of shaking 
the head could signal the need to recruit cognitive control resources. Consequently, 
subsequent performance on a task that draws on these resources should be enhanced. The 
reverse may be true for head nodding. Due to the association between this motor action and 
situations that can be handled with less effort, lesser amounts of cognitive control resources 
may be mobilized, resulting in poorer performance on tasks that require cognitive control.  
In two studies, these assumptions were investigated. In the initial part of the 
experiments, participants were unobtrusively induced to nod or shake their heads. 
Subsequently, a cognitive control task was administered that required participants to flexibly 
shift back and forth between different categorization rules (see e.g., Monsell, 2003). It was 
predicted that participants who engaged in head shaking prior to this task would be better 
able to accomplish this task than participants who engaged in head nodding.  
Study 5.1 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-three undergraduate students (15 males and 58 females; mean 
age 21.7 years) participated in this study in exchange for course credits or 2 euros. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of the between-subjects factor head 
movement (head shaking or head nodding).   
Procedure and material. The first part of the experiment aimed at unobtrusively 
inducing participants to either shake or nod their heads. Participants were told that they were 
participating in a series of unrelated studies, the first of which ostensibly dealt with the 
influence of motion on the perception of visual cues. Participants were instructed to follow a 
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moving ball on the computer screen continuously with their heads (cf. DeMarree, Briñol, & 
Petty, 2008; Förster, 2004). Every time the color of the ball changed, participants were 
required to immediately press a specified button on the keyboard. In the head nodding 
condition, the ball moved vertically back and forth between the upper and lower edge of the 
screen. In the head shaking condition, the ball moved horizontally back and forth between the 
right and left edge of the screen. The path that the ball described covered a distance of about 
20 cm (7.87 inches) in both conditions. The head movement phase lasted approximately 4 
minutes and was followed by several questions concerning the effortfulness of the head 
movements, the participants’ mood state, and their momentary physical and mental 
exhaustion.  
Next, a task switching paradigm was administered that gauged the cognitive ability to 
flexibly adapt to changing task requirements and formed an index of ongoing cognitive 
control mechanisms. Participants had to categorize numbers from 1 to 10 by one of two 
simple categorization rules (cf. Monsell, 2003). The color in which the numbers were written 
served as a cue to which rule to apply on a given trial. Numbers that were written in yellow 
had to be categorized as even or odd, whereas numbers in blue had to be categorized as 
greater or smaller than five.  
The performance cost of switching from one categorization rule to the other was the 
dependent measure of interest. These switching costs can be calculated by contrasting 
performance (in terms of either error rates or reaction times) on switching trials with 
performance on repetition trials. Repetition trials refer to trials on which the same 
categorization rule has to be applied as on the foregoing trial, whereas switching trials are 
those trials on which the categorization rule differs from the one that was appropriate on the 
preceding trial.    
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Responses had to be given within a response deadline of 3000 ms by pressing one of 
two specified buttons on the keyboard. Errors and deadline violations were indicated by a red 
cross displayed in the centre of the screen for 200 ms. After each trial, a blank screen 
appeared for the duration of 150 ms.   
The first two blocks were practice blocks consisting of 25 trials each on which the 
two categorization tasks were practiced separately. Next, participants were informed that the 
two categorization tasks would be combined into a single task on the remaining blocks, with 
the color of the stimuli indicating which of the two tasks to perform on a given trial. The two 
tasks were alternated in a random-like order, with the restriction that the same task was not 
repeated more than three times in a row. Participants completed four blocks of task switching, 
with each block consisting of 40 trials.  
After completion of the task, demographic variables were assessed. Finally, 
participants were debriefed, paid, and thanked. 
Results 
Error switch costs. Error switch costs were calculated by subtracting the mean error 
rate on repetition trials from the mean error rate on switching trials (Rogers & Monsell, 1995, 
see also Koch et al., 2008). The data of 1 participant were excluded from the analysis for 
exceeding the mean error rate by more than 2.5 SDs. To test our hypothesis, an independent-
samples t-test on the error switch costs for the two head movement conditions was 
performed. A significant difference in error switch costs depending on head movement 
condition emerged, t(71) = 2.03, p = .046, η² = .06. Error switch costs were significantly 
lower in the head shaking (M = 2.62, SD = 4.73) compared to the head nodding condition (M 
= 4.77, SD = 4.31).    
  Reaction times (RT) switch costs. RT switch costs were calculated by subtracting the 
mean RT on repetition trials from the mean RT on switching trials (Rogers & Monsell, 1995, 
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see also Koch et al., 2008). RTs deviating more than 2.5 SDs from a participant’s mean RT 
for the respective trial type (switch or repetition trials) and RTs from error trials were 
excluded from the analyses. The mean temporal cost of switching between tasks amounted to 
314 ms (SD = 173). No significant effect of head movement on RT switch costs was found, t 
< 1.  
Self-report ratings. To test whether the conditions differed with regard to the physical 
effortfulness of the head movements, the self-rated effortfulness of both movement 
conditions (measured on a 100-point scale ranging from 1 = “not at all effortful” to 100 = 
“very effortful”) was subjected to an independent-samples t-test. Head shaking (M = 66.11) 
and head nodding (M = 69.11) were rated as equally effortful, t < 1. Furthermore, the effect 
of head movement on the error switch costs remained significant when the effortfulness of 
the head movements was entered as a covariate in the analysis, indicating that the effect of 
head movement on error costs was not mediated by the effortfulness of the movements. 
Self-report ratings of the participants’ mood state, and their momentary physical and 
mental exhaustion did also not differ between head movement conditions, all t’s < 1, neither 
did these variables mediate the effect of head movement on switching ability.  
Discussion 
Study 5.1 revealed a significant effect of overt head movements on a subsequent task 
switching paradigm. Participants who were induced to shake their heads during the initial 
phase of the experiment, subsequently showed better task switching ability than participants 
who were induced to nod their heads. This effect was independent of the effortfulness of the 
head movements. Furthermore, participants in the two head movement conditions did not 
differ with regard to their mood state and their level of mental and physical exhaustion 
following the head movement manipulation.  
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In Study 5.2, we tried to replicate the basic finding of Study 5.1 in order to show the 
robustness of the effect. Furthermore, to get more insight in the underlying mechanisms, a 
no-movement control condition was added to the design of the first study. By doing so, we 
were able to determine whether the effect was driven primarily by one of the head movement 
conditions, or whether both movement conditions contributed to the effect.   
Study 5.2 
Method 
Participants. Eighty-one undergraduate students (11 males and 70 females; mean age 
22.0 years) participated in this study in exchange for course credit or 2 euros. Participants 
were randomly assigned to the conditions of the between-subjects factor head movement 
(head shaking vs. head nodding vs. no head movement).   
Procedure and material. Study 5.2 was a direct replication of Study 5.1, with the 
addition of a no-movement control condition. The instructions in this condition resembled 
those in the two experimental head movement conditions in that participants had to press a 
key each time the color of a ball displayed on the computer screen changed. However, in 
contrast to the experimental conditions, the ball in the control condition did not move but 
remained in the centre of the screen throughout the task. Subsequent to this initial phase of 
the experiment, in which head movements were either induced or not, the same task 
switching paradigm as in Study 5.1 was administered.   
Results 
Error switch costs. Error switch costs were calculated in the same way as in Study 
5.1, i.e., by subtracting the mean error rate on repetition trials from the mean error rate on 
switching trials. A one-way ANOVA with head movement condition (head shaking vs. head 
nodding vs. no head movement) as a between-subjects factor was performed on the error 
switch costs. Replicating the findings of Study 5.1, contrast tests revealed that participants in 
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the head shaking condition (M = 2.57, SD = 4.70) performed significantly better than 
participants in the head nodding condition (M = 4.92, SD = 3.82; t(78) = 2.08, p = .04, η² = 
.07). The error costs in the control condition (M = 3.77, SD = 3.83) fell in between those of 
the two experimental head movement conditions (see Figure 5.1), but did not differ 
significantly from either of them, both p’s > .26. 
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Figure 5.1. Error switch costs as a function of head movement condition. 
 
Reaction times (RT) switch costs. RT switch costs were calculated in the same way as 
in Study 5.1. A one-way ANOVA was performed on RT switch costs with head movement as 
between-subjects factor. On average, switching from one task to the other resulted in a 
temporal cost of 365 ms (SD = 166). Head movement condition did not have a significant 
effect on RT switch costs, F < 1.  
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Self-report ratings. The two experimental head movement conditions were rated as 
equally effortful (M = 73.50 and 71.08 in the nodding and shaking conditions, respectively), 
and participants in the head movement conditions did not differ in their reported mood state 
and their levels of mental or physical exhaustion following the head movement manipulation, 
all F’s < 1. Furthermore, the performance difference between the head shaking and head 
nodding conditions remained significant when each of these variables was entered as a 
covariate in the analysis, suggesting that the effect was not mediated by one of these 
variables.  
Discussion 
Study 5.2 replicated the finding that a period of head shaking prior to a cognitive functioning 
task enhances performance on this task relative to head nodding. Additionally, the results of 
the present study suggest that both forms of head movements contributed to this effect, as the 
performance in the no-movement control condition was in between the performances in the 
head shaking and head nodding conditions. No indications were found that the effect was 
attributable to differences in the physical effortfulness of the head movements, and the type 
of head movement that had to be performed did not influence the participants’ mood state or 
their self-rated level of mental or physical exhaustion.  
General Discussion 
The current research investigated how overt head movements shape cognitive functioning. 
Across two studies, shaking the head consistently enhanced performance on a task switching 
paradigm compared to nodding the head. Study 5.2 additionally suggested that both forms of 
head movements contributed to this effect, as performance in a no-movement control 
condition fell in between those of the experimental head movement conditions. In neither 
study an effect of head movement condition on RT switch costs was found, presumably due 
to the response window that was applied in both experiments.  
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The finding that overt head movements influence performance on a cognitive control 
task extends the literature on embodied cognition in several respects. First, the present 
research revealed that the kinds of processes that are influenced by overt head movements 
may not be restricted to attitudinal processes, but may also extend to more general, regulatory 
processes. That is, overt head movements seem to regulate cognitive functioning through 
their associative links with situations that differ in their demand of cognitive control. Head 
shaking is the embodied expression of disagreement or disapproval, a cognitive state that 
usually requires and consumes greater amounts of cognitive control than agreement or 
approval. Therefore, merely performing this head movement seems to mobilize the extra 
amount of cognitive resources usually required under these conditions. In contrast to head 
shaking, head nodding does not lead to the mobilization of cognitive resources as these 
resources are usually not required under circumstances of general agreement with (or 
approval of) the momentary situation. 
In addition to the kinds of processes that are influenced by overt head movements, the 
present research also addressed the time frame during which these movements may exert 
their influence. Head movements may either merely have an effect at the time that the 
movements are actually performed or, alternatively, may keep influencing information 
processing even when performance of the movements and the measurement of the dependent 
variable are temporally separated from each other. Prior research focused almost exclusively 
on the on-line effects of head shaking and head nodding, that is effects that occur at the same 
time that the respective head movement is performed (e.g., Briñol & Petty, 2003; Wells & 
Petty, 1980: but see DeMarree et al., 2008). The current studies showed that overt head 
movements may also have longer lasting effects that continue influencing information 
processing even when the immediate embodied cue is no longer present.   
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As outlined in the introduction of this paper, head shaking and head nodding can also 
be interpreted as a form of approach and avoidance behavior (e.g., Förster, 2004), with head 
nodding indicating approach and head shaking indicating avoidance. In this respect, the 
present findings converge with previous findings on another type of approach and avoidance 
motor actions, namely approach-avoidance arm movements (Koch et al., 2008, 2009a). These 
prior studies showed that extending the arm, as in pushing away an undesired object (i.e., 
avoidance), enhanced different aspects of executive functioning relative to flexing the arm, as 
in pulling something desired towards the self (i.e., approach).  
Although various kinds of bodily actions such as arm movements, overt head 
movements or body locomotion can be broadly categorized as approach or avoidance 
behavior, it should be kept in mind that every movement also has its own characteristic, 
contextual meaning that distinguishes it from other movements that can similarly be broadly 
classified as approach or avoidance behavior. For example, whereas approach and avoidance 
arm movements are in most instances a simple means to adjust the distance between desired 
or undesired objects and the self, overt head movements instead fulfill to a greater extent a 
communicative, social function and are therefore more relevant in interpersonal contexts. 
Distinguishing between a general approach-avoidance effect and the more movement-specific 
effects may form an interesting direction for future research.  
In summary, the present studies provided preliminary evidence that overt head 
movements, besides their well-established effects on attitudinal processes, may also regulate 
more fundamental, capacity-related functioning. A period of head shaking seems to suffice to 
energize cognitive control functions, and this regulatory effect seems to persist even after the 
individual has stopped performing the movement. 
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In the present dissertation we examined the role of approach and avoidance motor actions in 
the regulation of cognitive control processes. We had two main objectives, first, to explore 
the effects of approach and avoidance motor actions on cognitive control, and second, to gain 
insight into the mechanisms underlying these effects. Extending previous findings in the 
embodiment literature, we argued that the performance of approach and avoidance motor 
actions not only re-activates discrete affective or cognitive experiences these movements are 
associated with, but also regulates cognitive functioning on a more basic level, by triggering 
the up- and down-regulation of cognitive control. In order to substantiate this assertion, we 
investigated how the concurrent execution of various approach and avoidance movements 
affects performance on cognitive control tasks. Furthermore, we tested the assumption that 
performance differences arise from the differential allocation of cognitive resources, such that 
avoidance movements enhance cognitive performance relative to approach movements 
through the up-regulation of cognitive resources devoted to a task. In this final chapter, we 
will review the empirical evidence gathered in Chapters 2 to 5 and place these findings in a 
broader context. Finally, implications of the present results and directions for future research 
will be discussed.  
 
Overview of the current findings 
In the preceding chapters the effects of approach and avoidance motor actions on cognitive 
control were systematically investigated. In Chapter 2, we started out by studying the effects 
of arm extension (avoidance) and arm flexion (approach) on the two most elementary 
cognitive control functions, inhibitory control and task switching ability (Smith & Jonides, 
1999). In Study 2.1 we gauged inhibitory control by means of a Stroop (1935) color naming 
task and found that avoidance arm movements enhanced performance on this task, such that 
error rates on inconsistent trials were significantly lower for participants who performed an 
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avoidance, compared to an approach movement. The performance of the no-movement 
control condition relative to the two experimental arm movement conditions suggested that 
both approach and avoidance movements affected Stroop performance, though in opposite 
directions. That is, avoidance movements seemed to enhance while approach movements 
seemed to hamper the inhibition of automatic response tendencies. In Study 2.2 we studied 
the effect of approach and avoidance arm movements on a task switching paradigm that 
gauged the ability to flexibly adapt to changing task demands. In this follow-up study, we 
aimed to extend the previous findings to another cognitive control function and to gain more 
insight in the properties of approach and avoidance motor influences. This second objective 
was reached by studying the effects of arm movements in a within-subjects design that 
required participants to alternate between approach and avoidance motor actions on four 
consecutive blocks of trials. Corroborating the results of Study 2.1, avoidance motor actions 
enhanced task switching ability, such that the temporal cost of switching between different 
categorization rules was significantly lower under arm extension compared to arm flexion 
conditions. The results obtained with this within-subjects design also speak to the momentary 
nature of embodied influences on cognitive control. The effects of approach and avoidance 
arm movements seem to occur on-line and exert their influence primarily at the time that they 
are performed. As soon as a new embodied signal is received, the previous one seems to be 
entirely overwritten.  
These basic findings were subsequently extended to other forms of approach-
avoidance behavior. In Chapter 4, we studied the regulatory effects of forward and backward 
body locomotion on cognitive control, in order to establish a novel operationalization of 
approach-avoidance behavior with higher ecological validity. In everyday life, individuals 
habitually and naturally approach desired objects by stepping forward and avoid aversive 
objects by stepping backward. Hence, body locomotion seems to tap the fundamental nature 
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of approach-avoidance behavior more directly than for example arm flexion or arm extension 
movements. The findings of this study were in line with the results gathered with approach 
and avoidance arm movements in Chapter 2, such that backward locomotion significantly 
enhanced inhibitory control in a Stroop (1935) color naming task relative to forward or 
sideways locomotion. 
 The mechanisms that underlie the observed performance differences on cognitive 
control tasks were the focus of Chapter 3. In a first step, we further established the effect of 
approach and avoidance arm movements on task switching ability in a between-subjects 
design (Study 3.1). Next, we designed a study that provided the opportunity to directly test 
the role of energy mobilization in the performance gap resulting from approach and 
avoidance motor actions (Study 3.2). After having performed significantly better on an initial 
control task, participants in the avoidance movement condition subsequently showed greater 
indications of cognitive depletion on a persistence measure compared to participants in the 
approach movement condition. Crucially, depletion on the second task mediated the effect of 
arm movements on the cognitive control task, suggesting that the enhanced performance on 
the cognitive control task in the avoidance condition was indeed fueled by increased resource 
allocation.  
The results of this study also have further reaching implications as to the -- so far 
assumed -- functional character of avoidance movements. More precisely, the functionality of 
avoidance motor actions seems to be limited by capacity constraints, which means that their 
advantageous effects seem to apply primarily to the immediate situation and hamper 
cognitive performance on later occasions. Still it appears functional to recruit cognitive 
resources at the time that a difficult situation is encountered, even if this performance boost 
tends to be followed by a state of cognitive depletion. A critical factor in this regard is the 
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duration of the capacity-demanding situation. That is, the difficult situation should be 
resolved before cognitive resources run short.  
 Finally, in Chapter 5 the embodied regulatory mechanisms investigated in the present 
dissertation were generalized to overt head movements. Although head shaking and nodding 
can be broadly classified as a form of approach and avoidance behavior (e.g., Bamford & 
Ward, 2008; Förster, 2004), these movements first and foremost fulfill a communicative 
function as to indicate agreement/approval or disagreement/disapproval. Yet, the general 
theoretical framework sketched in the current dissertation also applies to this type of motor 
actions, as the processing requirements associated with overt head shaking and nodding are 
similar to those associated with avoidance and approach contexts, respectively. In support of 
this notion, we found that a period of head shaking significantly improved performance on a 
subsequent task switching paradigm relative to a period of head nodding (Studies 5.1 and 
5.2). In prior research, overt head movements have almost exclusively been studied in 
relation to attitudinal processes. The research described in Chapter 5 showed that these 
movements also have broader regulatory implications. Head shaking tended to increase the 
recruitment of cognitive resources relative to head nodding, resulting in enhanced 
performance on a measure of cognitive control. Additionally, as the manipulation of head 
movements and the gauging of cognitive control processes were separated in time in Studies 
5.1 and 5.2, the findings obtained in this chapter suggest that overt head movements have 
longer lasting regulatory implications that endure even when the original bodily cue is no 
longer present. 
 
Control-regulatory mechanisms as a second class of embodiment effects 
In the general introduction of the current dissertation, we sketched a framework for 
embodiment effects that distinguishes between two classes of phenomena. The first class 
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comprises the effects that are derived from the general assumption that motor programs 
constitute a core component of modal memory representations of associated cognitive and 
affective states (cf. Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003). That is, the performance 
of certain motor actions tends to re-activate other modalities that are associated with these 
movements, such as corresponding affective and cognitive experiences. The finding that 
approach and avoidance motor actions shape the affective evaluation of neutral objects 
(Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993) is a typical example of this type of embodiment 
effect. Similarly, cognitive and affective contents tend to facilitate motor programs that 
habitually accompany their experience. For instance, Zwaan and Taylor (2006) observed that 
upon hearing sentences that imply a specified movement of the hand (e.g., “He turned down 
the volume”), congruent motor actions (i.e., counterclockwise rotations of the hand) are 
performed faster than incongruent motor actions (i.e., clockwise rotations of the hand). Most 
prior research on embodiment effects pertains to this first class of phenomena, with a few 
exceptions in the domain of approach and avoidance related motor actions, as will be 
discussed later.  
 The results obtained in the present dissertation corroborate the assumption raised in 
the general introduction that motor actions may influence human functioning on a much 
broader and more fundamental level than the bulk of the existing embodiment literature 
suggests. More specifically, embodiment effects seem to extend to a second class of 
phenomena that captures the recruitment of cognitive control processes. That is, the 
performance of certain motor actions fundamentally acts upon human functioning by 
regulating the amount of cognitive control that is available in a given situation. Avoidance 
motor actions tend to trigger the up-regulation of cognitive control, thereby enabling the 
cognitive system to perform complex and capacity-intensive operations. Approach motor 
actions, to the contrary, tend to down-regulate cognitive control, leading to a reduced 
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capability to perform cognitive operations that are capacity-demanding. As a result of the 
lower levels of cognitive control available to perform various executive processes, 
performance on tasks drawing on these capacities tends to be generally impaired by approach 
motor actions. Instead, approach motor actions seem to engender a capacity-economic, 
associative operation mode, which may be beneficial to the performance of some tasks, 
specifically those that require uninhibited associative processing. 
 The second class of phenomena clearly goes beyond the discrete effects reported in 
earlier research, as the regulatory mechanisms that these effects pertain to affect human 
functioning in its broadest sense. Instead of merely eliciting associated modalities, the human 
organism as a whole is affected by the up- or down-regulation of cognitive energy. The 
present findings suggest that approach and avoidance motor action play a major role in 
initiating basic changes in an individual’s momentary cognitive energy supply.  
  Some prior studies have reported processing outcomes of approach and avoidance 
motor actions that seem congruent with the control-regulatory function that we propose on 
the basis of our research findings. We will specify how these earlier processing outcomes can 
be integrated in a control-regulatory account. Before doing so, however, we first want to 
place control regulation in the broader context of existing self-regulatory accounts. 
 
Fitting control regulation into existing self-regulation theories 
The regulatory mechanism studied in the present dissertation may have implications as to the 
operating principles of existing self-regulation models. Although admittedly rather 
speculative, we assume that the up- and down-regulation of cognitive control may be a 
fundamental regulatory mechanism that explicates how self-regulation is eventually achieved. 
Existing self-regulatory accounts generally distinguish between two functional systems, a 
deliberative system that processes information in a rule-based, serial fashion, and an 
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associative system that processes information on the basis of simple associative principles, 
thereby inducing a parallel, fast, and effortless processing style (e.g., Kuhl, 2000; Schwarz, 
2002; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Although theories differ in their 
terminology (e.g., “systematic”, “reflective”, ”central”, and “analytical” for the deliberative 
system, and “heuristic”, ”impulsive”, ”automatic”, and ”peripheral” for the associative 
system), their level of refinement, and their functional emphasis, they seem to boil down to 
largely overlapping constructs (see Smith & DeCoster, 2000, for a more exhaustive 
comparison of dual-process accounts).  
For instance, Kuhl’s (2000) Personality Systems Interaction (PSI) theory posits that 
human mental functioning is guided by the relative activation of two high-level systems that 
foster either analytical, sequential processing (i.e., intention memory) or holistic, heuristic 
thinking (i.e., extension memory). The activation of the two systems is assumed to be 
modulated by changes in affect, such that increases in negative affect and decreases in 
positive affect strengthen intention memory and attenuate extension memory, whereas 
decreases in negative affect and increases in positive affect strengthen extension memory and 
attenuate intention memory. Similarly, cognitive tuning theory (Schwarz, 2002) distinguishes 
between a heuristic, top-down, and a systematic, bottom-up processing style. The adoption of 
either of these processing styles is assumed to be tuned to meet situational requirements. That 
is, in the face of cues that are indicative of problematic environments (e.g., negative mood or 
avoidance bodily cues) a systematic processing style is spontaneously adopted, enabling the 
individual to react appropriately and ward off harmful consequences. However, when internal 
or environmental cues signal benign circumstances (e.g., positive mood or approach bodily 
cues), individuals are inclined to rely on less effortful, heuristic processing, as this processing 
mode suffices under these conditions. In a related vein, Strack and Deutsch (2004) developed 
a self-regulation model that describes human functioning as a joint function of two 
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interacting systems, an impulsive and a reflective system. The impulsive system follows the 
rules of a simple associative network, whereas the reflective system forms the basis for 
deliberative processes.  
 Dual-process models as the ones described in the foregoing paragraph typically have a 
strong emphasis on processing outcomes, that is, they specify how activation of the two 
mental systems shapes various processes in a dynamic fashion. With regard to the 
mechanisms that engender the activation of either the deliberative or the associative system in 
the first place, however, they tend to be less elaborate. In our view, the activation of these 
two systems may be a joint function of the availability of cognitive control on the part of the 
individual (high vs. low), and the amount of cognitive control the task at hand requires (high 
vs. low). More specifically, optimal performance may be achieved when the energy status of 
the individual converges with the task demands (i.e., performing a difficult task when 
cognitive capacity is high, or performing an easy task when cognitive capacity is low). In the 
first case, the deliberative system, and in the second case the associative system, may take 
over. Likewise, a mismatch between the energy status of the individual and the task demands 
will probably hamper performance. That is, performance of a difficult task may lead to stress 
or frustration when the necessary resources to perform the task properly are lacking, and a 
capacity surplus may block the initiation of associative processes required to perform well on 
certain types of tasks. Hence, the availability of cognitive control and the control 
requirements of the task may be two major determinants of the relative activation of the two 
processing systems.  
The up- and down-regulation of cognitive control processes may also provide an 
explanation for earlier findings on the processing outcomes of approach and avoidance motor 
actions. For instance, as described in greater detail in the introduction of this dissertation, 
Friedman and Förster (2000, 2002) observed enhanced creativity in approach oriented, and 
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improved analytical reasoning abilities in avoidance oriented participants. These findings can 
be accounted for by a control-regulatory mechanism, building on the knowledge obtained in 
the present research. More precisely, because avoidance related bodily cues tend to increase 
the recruitment of cognitive control, performing these motor actions creates the conditions 
that are necessary for engaging in effortful, deliberate processing, thereby enhancing 
performance on analytical reasoning tasks. In a complementary fashion, to the extent that 
performing approach motor actions downregulates cognitive control, utilization of the 
associative mental system is facilitated when deployed cognitive resources are minimized, 
i.e., in a control-relaxed frame of mind. As a consequence, approach oriented individuals tend 
to perform better on tasks that require holistic, associative or intuitive processing.  
 Certainly more research is needed to corroborate the control-regulatory mechanisms 
sketched in this section and the range of cues that exert an influence on the up- and down-
regulation of cognitive control. Combining the findings of the present dissertation with 
insights from neuroscientific research on cognitive control offers one possible avenue for 
future research. For instance, building on the present results, we would predict that the mere 
performance of avoidance motor actions increases activity in brain regions that are 
responsible for the recruitment of cognitive control (such as the anterior cingulate cortex; 
Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). Similarly, the mere performance of approach motor 
actions may decrease activity in relevant brain areas. Such corroborating evidence would 
make a strong case in underpinning the regulatory properties of approach and avoidance 
motor actions. 
 
Directions for future research 
In this section we would like to address potential directions for future research that we 
consider relevant for further advancing our understanding of the regulatory implications of 
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approach-avoidance motor actions. A first avenue for future research pertains to alternative 
ways of gauging the investment of cognitive control resources. In the present work, Chapter 3 
in particular addressed the role of resource mobilization as the regulatory mechanisms 
underlying performance differences resulting from approach and avoidance motor actions. 
We found that the execution of avoidance movements not only enhanced performance on a 
cognitive control task, but also caused performance decrements on a subsequent persistence 
task that indicated the degree of cognitive depletion. Critically, the level of depletion 
mediated the effect of approach-avoidance arm movements on the initial cognitive control 
task, suggesting that performance on the control task was indeed a function of resource 
allocation.  
An interesting extension of these findings concerns the question whether the greater 
mobilization of cognitive resources also manifests itself on physiological measures of energy 
allocation, such as an individual’s blood sugar level.1 We would expect that the performance 
boost caused by avoidance motor actions does indeed lead to more pronounced declines in 
blood sugar levels. Paralleling the effects reported in the present dissertation, we would also 
predict that changes in blood sugar level (as an indicator of resource allocation) play a 
mediating role in the effect of approach-avoidance motor actions on cognitive performance. 
Such physiological evidence would further corroborate the results that we obtained with 
cognitive indicators of resource depletion.  
Second, in the present research we investigated the effects of approach and avoidance 
movements in relation to two executive functions that are generally considered the most 
elementary ones (e.g., Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000; Smith & 
Jonides, 1999). However, as outlined in the general introduction, cognitive control constitutes 
an umbrella term for various executive functions, including for instance the abilities to plan a 
                                                 
1
 We want to thank Olivier Corneille for this research suggestion. 
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sequence of actions, to accomplish a certain goal (planning), and to update and check the 
contents of working memory (monitoring). On the basis of the present results it remains 
unclear whether the effects of approach and avoidance motor actions generalize to all 
executive functions, or whether the effects only hold for the specific executive functions that 
we studied. Future research should examine executive functions in a more comprehensive 
fashion to address this generalization issue. However, as executive functions typically pertain 
to deliberate, effortful processes, we would assume that avoidance motor actions have a 
similar facilitating effect on most if not all of them.  
Related to this issue, the present dissertation primarily highlighted the advantageous 
effects of avoidance related bodily cues, although it seems worthwhile to also explore the 
conditions under which approach related bodily cues prove functional. As mentioned earlier, 
approach motor actions have been shown to enhance creative processes (Friedman & Förster, 
2000, 2002). Presumably, approach bodily cues may facilitate a wide range of processes that 
benefit from an associative or a holistic orientation or require fast, habitual reactions. 
Accurate face recognition is an example of a cognitive ability that tends to be significantly 
enhanced under a global processing orientation (e.g., Macrae & Lewis, 2002). Hence, we 
would suppose that face recognition benefits from the concurrent performance of approach, 
as opposed to avoidance, motor actions. Additionally, we would assume that the implicit 
attitude-behavior link (see e.g., Conner, Perugini, O’Gorman, Ayres, & Prestwich, 2007) is 
strengthened in approach oriented individuals, such that implicit attitudes become more 
predictive of actual behavior in an approach orientation (see also De Vries, Holland, & 
Witteman, 2008).  
It should also be noted that we do not preclude the possibility that under certain 
conditions an approach orientation may also enhance executive functions of the type that we 
studied in this dissertation (see e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2005b). For instance, an individual 
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who strives for a certain desired goal may be inclined to amplify cognitive efforts when 
obstacles to reach that goal are encountered. Alternatively, approach oriented individuals may 
be more amenable to context effects, and more likely to comply with subtly communicated 
task demands. For example, when task performance is subtly placed in an achievement 
context, or when achievement is made salient in another way (e.g., through priming), 
approach-oriented individuals may be more strongly inclined to adjust their behavior 
accordingly by increasing their cognitive investments (cf. Elliot & Maier, 2007). To obtain a 
more complete picture of the processes that are instigated by approach and avoidance motor 
actions, these motor actions should be studied in relation to a broader range of cognitive 
abilities, taking into consideration other factors that might affect the recruitment of cognitive 
resources. 
As noted previously, the present dissertation primarily highlighted the beneficial 
consequences of performing avoidance motor actions. An exception to this rule is Chapter 3, 
as the findings obtained in this chapter point to the detrimental long-term effects of avoidance 
motor actions. Due to the enhanced immediate investment of cognitive resources, 
performance on subsequent tasks is hampered by the greater depletion of resources. As 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, more research is needed to explore the dynamic 
properties of approach and avoidance bodily cues over time. For instance, it should be 
examined whether repeatedly inducing avoidance motor actions can postpone the emergence 
of depletion effects. A related research question concerns the possibility of overcoming 
emergent states of cognitive depletion through the performance of avoidance motor actions. 
Empirical evidence on these issues is lacking so far. 
Finally, the endurance of different types of motor signals may form an interesting 
issue to further elaborate on in future research. On the basis of the results obtained with the 
within-subjects design in Study 2.2 we concluded that approach and avoidance arm 
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movements have a momentary nature that is overwritten as soon as a new relevant embodied 
signal is received. In Chapter 5, we studied the effects of overt head movements on cognitive 
control and found that head movements have a longer lasting regulatory effect that spans a 
temporal gap between the actual performance of the relevant movement and the execution of 
cognitive control. However, it may be premature to conclude that approach and avoidance 
arm movements solely produce on-line effects that occur at the time that the movements are 
actually performed. Possibly arm movements may also display longer lasting effects on 
cognitive functioning that endure even when the movement is no longer performed, provided 
that no new embodied signal overwrites the original signal. In the studies reported in the 
present dissertation, approach and avoidance arm movements were always performed 
concurrently with the tasks that assessed cognitive functioning. In order to draw definite 
conclusions with regard to the temporal laws underlying different approach and avoidance 
movements, additional scientific inquiry is needed.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The findings reported in the present dissertation suggest that approach and avoidance motor 
actions tend to act upon the recruitment of cognitive control processes. Across different 
executive functions and operationalizations of approach and avoidance behavior, avoidance 
bodily signals consistently improved cognitive functioning compared to approach bodily 
signals. These effects seem to stem from the enhanced mobilization of cognitive resources 
triggered by avoidance, compared to approach, bodily signals. Although avoidance motor 
actions are clearly beneficial for cognitive functioning in the short run, our results also speak 
to the other side of the medal, namely that performance on later occasions may be impaired 
due to the lower residual cognitive capacity. We hope that the current dissertation contributed 
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to our understanding of the regulatory mechanisms that are initiated by the performance of 
approach and avoidance motor actions. 
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In the present dissertation, the effects of approach and avoidance related bodily cues on 
cognitive control processes were investigated. The general prediction underlying this research 
line was that avoidance-related bodily signals enhance cognitive control relative to approach-
related bodily signals. We studied the effects of approach-avoidance bodily cues on different 
cognitive control functions to corroborate our central hypothesis. Furthermore, we addressed 
the mechanisms that underlie the observed performance differences resulting from approach 
and avoidance motor signals (Chapter 3). Across studies, different operationalizations of 
approach and avoidance bodily cues were used. In part, we relied on well-established 
manipulations of approach and avoidance such as arm flexion and extension (Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3). In Chapter 4 we introduced forward and backward locomotion as a novel 
procedure to manipulate approach and avoidance. Finally, Chapter 5 examined the effects of 
overt head movements on cognitive control.  
 Chapter 2 provided first evidence for the regulatory function of approach and 
avoidance motor actions in activating cognitive control processes. We compared the 
performance of participants who executed either approach or avoidance arm movements on 
tasks tapping into different control functions. More specifically, in Study 2.1 performance 
differences on a Stroop (1935) color naming task were investigated, a task that draws on the 
ability to inhibit automatic response tendencies. In line with our central hypothesis, 
performance was significantly enhanced for participants who concurrently performed an 
avoidance arm movement compared to participants who concurrently performed an approach 
arm movement. Comparisons with a no-movement control group also suggested that both the 
approach and the avoidance conditions contributed to this effect. That is, avoidance cues had 
a beneficial, and approach cues a detrimental effect on Stroop performance. In Study 2.2 this 
effect was generalized to a different executive function, task switching, which refers to the 
ability to shift focused attention between different tasks. Importantly, in this study, we 
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manipulated approach and avoidance motor actions within-subjects. That is, participants 
alternated between approach and avoidance arm movements while performing the task. 
Again, a significant influence of approach and avoidance movements on task performance 
was observed. Avoidance bodily cues enhanced, and approach bodily cues deteriorated the 
ability to switch focused attention. 
 Chapter 3 was directed at identifying the mechanisms that underlie the performance 
differences resulting from approach and avoidance bodily signals. We hypothesized that 
approach and avoidance cues may directly regulate the mobilization of energy, such that they 
lead to the up or down regulation of cognitive functioning. More specifically, avoidance cues 
were predicted to boost cognitive functioning through the mobilization of cognitive 
resources. Approach cues, in contrast, were predicted to lower the amount of cognitive 
energy mobilized, resulting in poorer cognitive performance. These predictions were tested 
with a cognitive functioning task followed by a cognitive depletion task. To confirm our 
resource allocation account, performance on the cognitive functioning task should be 
mediated by the degree of cognitive depletion on the later task, implying that performance is 
dependent on the expenditure of cognitive resources. In support of this claim, participants in 
the avoidance condition displayed superior performance on the initial switching task 
compared to the approach condition, but were more prone to resource depletion on the second 
task. Importantly, mediational analyses revealed that performance on the cognitive control 
task was indeed a function of resource allocation. As a direct consequence of this resource 
allocation account, a more nuanced picture of approach and avoidance bodily signals 
emerged: Avoidance cues tend to be functional in the short run, as performance benefits from 
the greater immediate allocation of cognitive resources. However, in the long run 
performance may suffer when cognitive resources become depleted.  
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In Chapter 4 we turned to a novel embodied manipulation of approach and avoidance 
that more directly tapped into the fundamental nature of these action tendencies. Prior 
research has mainly been directed at the effects of approach-avoidance arm movements. 
However, body locomotion may be argued to constitute a more ecologically valid form of 
approach and avoidance behavior, as individuals typically approach desired objects by 
stepping forward and avoid aversive objects by stepping backward. Study 4.1 introduced 
forward and backward body locomotion as a novel form of manipulating approach and 
avoidance behavior, and investigated the effects of stepping direction on cognitive control 
processes. Immediately after participants stepped either in the forward (approach), backward 
(avoidance), or sideways (control) direction, cognitive functioning was assessed by means of 
a Stroop (1935) task. Results revealed that stepping in the backward direction significantly 
enhanced cognitive control relative to stepping in the forward or sideways direction. Hence, 
Study 4.1 further validated the findings of the previous chapters, while at the same time 
establishing a new procedure with higher ecological validity. 
In Chapter 5 we examined the effects of head nodding and head shaking on cognitive 
control processes. Head nodding constitutes the embodied expression of agreement or 
approval, whereas head shaking stands for disagreement or disapproval. Overt head 
movements can be broadly considered a form of approach and avoidance behavior, as head 
nodding is associated with the acquirement of desired outcomes, and head shaking with the 
avoidance of undesired outcomes. Moreover, the processing requirements associated with 
overt head shaking and nodding are similar to those associated with avoidance and approach 
contexts, respectively. More specifically, head shaking is indicative of an undesirable state 
that requires cognitive effort in order to be dissolved. Hence, this bodily signal is associated 
with effortful processing and the need for cognitive control. Head nodding, in contrast, is 
associated with beneficial, optimal conditions that do not require cognitive effort on the part 
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of the individual. We predicted that unobtrusively inducing participants to nod or shake their 
heads would activate the cognitive modality habitually associated with these movements. In 
support of this assumption, a period of head shaking resulted in enhanced performance on a 
task switching paradigm compared to a period of head nodding. 
Together, the findings reported in the present dissertation suggest that bodily signals 
related to approach and avoidance behavior fulfill a regulatory function in the recruitment of 
cognitive control processes. Across different executive functions and operationalizations of 
approach-avoidance, avoidance bodily signals consistently improved cognitive functioning 
compared to approach bodily signals. These effects seem to stem from the enhanced 
mobilization of cognitive resources triggered by avoidance, compared to approach, bodily 
signals. 
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Sommige lichaamsbewegingen zijn nauw verbonden met bepaalde situationele contexten. Zo 
hebben mensen de neiging om terug te deinzen voor gevaar, terwijl ze aantrekkelijke dingen 
gewoonlijk benaderen. Deze sterke link tussen toenaderings- en vermijdingsbewegingen 
enerzijds, en positieve en negatieve omstandigheden anderzijds blijkt bijvoorbeeld ook uit het 
effect dat  het maken van deze bewegingen op de evaluatie van objecten kan hebben. 
Onderzoek op het gebied van embodiment heeft laten zien dat mensen abstracte tekens 
positiever beoordelen als ze ondertussen een toenaderingsbeweging maken, en negatiever als 
de beoordeling samengaat met een vermijdingsbeweging. 
 In dit proefschrift werden de regulatieve effecten van toenaderings- en 
vermijdingsbewegingen onderzocht. Aan de hand van meerdere studies laten we zien dat 
toenaderings- en vermijdingsbewegingen niet alleen van invloed zijn op evaluatieve 
processen, maar ook een rol spelen bij de regulatie van fundamentele cognitieve controle 
mechanismen. De term cognitieve controle is een verzamelterm voor verschillende cognitieve 
vaardigheden die ervoor zorgen dat ons gedrag in doelgerichte banen wordt geleid.  Hieronder 
valt bijvoorbeeld het vermogen om irrelevante informatie te negeren en in plaats daarvan te 
focussen op relevante informatie.  
Op grond van de situationele contexten waarin de bewegingen normaal gesproken 
optreden, zou het maken van een vermijdingsbeweging de cognitieve prestaties moeten 
verbeteren vergeleken met een toenaderingsbeweging. Vermijdingsbewegingen worden vaak 
uitgevoerd als er gevaar dreigt of andere moeilijkheden zich voordoen. Onder deze 
omstandigheden is het van cruciaal belang om snel en adequaat te reageren, omdat foutieve 
beslissingen ernstige gevolgen zouden hebben. Vermijdingsbewegingen worden dus in de 
loop van de tijd geassocieerd met de noodzaak om alert te zijn en snel te reageren. 
Toenaderingsbewegingen daarentegen worden meestal in situaties uitgevoerd waarin geen 
gevaar dreigt. Verhoogde waakzaamheid is onder deze omstandigheden minder vereist. 
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Deze hypothesen konden we aan de hand van een reeks studies bevestigen. 
Proefpersonen die vóór of gedurende een cognitieve controle taak een vermijdingsbeweging 
maakten, lieten een verhoogde cognitieve prestatie zien vergeleken bij personen die een 
toenaderingsbeweging maakten.  
Verschillende soorten toenaderings- en vermijdingsbewegingen zijn in dit proefschrift 
onderzocht. In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 wordt ingegaan op buig- en strekbewegingen van de arm (iets 
van je afduwen of naar je toe trekken). In hoofdstuk 4 beschrijven we de cognitieve 
consequenties van voorwaartse en achterwaartse voortbeweging. Hoofdstuk 5 gaat in op 
toenaderings- en vermijdingsbewegingen in bredere zin, namelijk hoofdknikken en 
hoofdschudden als algemene tekens van toestemming en afwijzing. Hoofdknikken is in sterke 
mate geassocieerd met het verkrijgen van positieve uitkomsten (toenadering), en 
hoofdschudden met het vermijden van negatieve uitkomsten (vermijding).  
De resultaten van deze onderzoeken laten zien dat toenaderings- en 
vermijdingsbewegingen inderdaad een belangrijke rol spelen bij de regulatie van cognitieve 
bronnen. Vermijdingsbewegingen blijken een positieve invloed te hebben op cognitieve 
prestaties omdat door deze bewegingen meer cognitieve bronnen beschikbaar komen. Echter, 
net als fysieke inspanning leidt cognitieve inspanning op lange termijn tot uitputting, 
waardoor de verbeterde prestaties van korte duur zijn.  
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Manche Körperbewegungen sind eng verknüpft mit bestimmten situationellen Kontexten. So 
weichen Menschen im Allgemeinen zurück vor Gefahr, während sie sich reizvollen Dingen 
üblicherweise annähern. Diese enge Verknüpfung von Annäherungs- und 
Vermeidungsbewegungen mit positiven bzw. negativen Umständen äußert sich auch darin, 
dass das bloße Ausführen dieser Bewegungen beispielsweise Einfluss haben kann auf die 
Wertschätzung von Objekten. Forschung auf dem Gebiet von embodiment    
hat gezeigt, dass Personen abstrakte Zeichen positiver bewerten wenn sie unterdessen eine 
Annäherungsbewegung ausführen, und negativer wenn die Bewertung begleitet wird von 
einer Vermeidungsbewegung.  
 In der vorliegenden Dissertation wurden die Auswirkungen von Annäherungs- und 
Vermeidungsbewegungen eingehend untersucht. In mehreren Studien zeigen wir, dass 
Annäherungs- und Vermeidungsbewegungen nicht nur evaluative Prozesse beeinflussen, 
sondern auch verantwortlich sind für die Regulation von grundlegenden kognitiven 
Kontrollmechanismen. Unter dem Begriff kognitive Kontrolle werden verschiedene kognitive 
Fähigkeiten zusammengefasst, die dafür sorgen, dass unser Verhalten in zielgerichtete 
Bahnen gelenkt wird. Hierzu zählt etwa die Fähigkeit, irrelevante Reize zu ignorieren und 
sich stattdessen auf relevante Informationen zu konzentrieren.   
 Aufgrund der situationellen Kontexte in denen die Bewegungen üblicherweise 
auftreten, sollte das Ausführen einer Vermeidungsbewegung die kognitiven Leistungen 
verglichen mit einer Annäherungsbewegung steigern. Vermeidungsbewegungen werden 
überwiegend in Situationen ausgeführt in denen Gefahr droht oder andere Schwierigkeiten 
auftreten. Unter diesen Umständen ist es besonders wichtig, schnell und adäquat zu reagieren, 
da fehlerhafte Entscheidungen schwerwiegende Konsequenzen haben könnten.  
Vermeidungsbewegungen werden also im Laufe der Zeit assoziiert mit der Notwendigkeit, 
mental wachsam zu sein und schnell zu reagieren. Annäherungsbewegungen dahingegen 
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treten normalerweise in Situationen auf, in denen keine Gefahr droht. Erhöhte Wachsamkeit 
ist unter diesen Umständen weniger vonnöten. 
 Diese Annahmen konnten wir in verschiedenen Studien belegen. Versuchspersonen, 
die Vermeidungsbewegungen ausführten bevor oder während sie Tests zur Messung 
kognitiver Kontrolle absolvierten, legten eine gesteigerte kognitive Leistung an den Tag, 
verglichen mit Personen die Annäherungsbewegungen ausführten.  
 Unterschiedliche Formen von Annäherungs- und Vermeidungsbewegungen wurden in 
der vorliegenden Dissertation untersucht. Kapitel 2 und 3 behandeln Beuge- und 
Streckbewegungen des Arms („etwas von sich wegschieben oder zu sich hin ziehen“). In 
Kapitel 4 beschreiben wir die kognitiven Auswirkungen von vorwärts- oder 
rückwartsgerichteter Fortbewegung. Kapitel 5 befasst sich mit Annäherungs- und 
Vermeidungsbewegungen im weiteren Sinne, und zwar Kopfnicken und Kopfschütteln als 
allgemeine Zeichen der Zustimmung und Ablehnung. Kopfnicken ist eng verknüpft mit dem 
Erwerb erwünschter Zustände (Annäherung), während Kopfschütteln assoziiert ist mit dem 
Vermeiden unerwünschter Zustände (Vermeidung).  
 Die Ergebnisse der Studien zeigen, dass Annäherungs- und Vermeidungsbewegungen 
in der Tat eine wichtige Rolle spielen bei der Regulation von kognitiven Ressourcen. 
Vermeidungsbewegungen scheinen die kognitive Leistungsfähigkeit zu verbessern, da durch 
diese Bewegungen mehr kognitive Ressourcen freigesetzt werden. Jedoch führen kognitive 
Anstrengungen, ebenso wie körperliche Anstrengungen, auf längere Sicht zu 
Erschöpfungszuständen, sodass die verbesserten Leistungen von kurzfristiger Dauer sind. 
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